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If losing a case on the merits in the appellate court is a
disappointment to the lawyer involved, to be defeated by a
rule of procedure seems the most bitter of pills. This frustra-
tion causes denial of justice-the aim of all courts. The client
is the one who suffers most, whether the fault lies in the ignor-
ance and carelessness of counsel,' a non-liberal attitude on the
part of the courts,2 the uncertainty of the law,' or in a combi-
nation of these factors. The result brings the law, its admin-
istration, and the bench and bar into disrepute with the public,
upon whose goodwill lawyers depend for existence.' The
* The writer is grateful for and acknowledges many helpful suggestions
from Professors Robert M. Hunter and Silas A. Harris of the Ohio State Uni-
versity College of Law, Professor Frederick Woodbridge of the University of
Cincinnati College of Law, and Professor William W. Dawson of the Western
Reserve University School of Law, Judge Charles A. Niman and Mr. Frank
Leonetti, both of the Cleveland Bar, the latter the winning counsel in the
Cullen case, and Miss Florence G. Denton, Mr. James W. Shocknessy, Mr.
Robert F. Ebinger, Mr. Ralph G. Martin, and Mr. James I. Boulger, all of
the Columbus Bar.
t 1936 A.B. Yale; 1939 LL.B., 194o LL.M. Harvard; Instructor, Ohio
State University College of Law. Author of leading articles in legal periodicals.
Cf. Daily v. Dovty, 5z Ohio App. 84, 192 N.E. 287 (1936).
cf. Williams v. Braun, 65 Ohio App. 451, 3o N.E. (7d) 363 (1940).
Examples of this statement will be furnished hereafter.
-'Sce Sunderland, Simplification of Appellate Procedure (1929) 3 U.
CIN. L. REV. I; Mitchell, Uniform State and Federal Practice: A New De-
mand for More Efficient Judicial Procedure (938) 24 Am. B.A.J. 981;
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experience in Ohio with the New Appellate Procedure Act'
offers an example of all these causes of fault. Responsibility
for correction rests squarely upon the bench and bar.
The Act stemmed from a desire to achieve more perfect
justice by simplifying procedure on review, preventing the dis-
position of cases other than upon their merits, and reducing
the amount of litigation over purely procedural matters. But
one source of difficulty created by those factors just mentioned'
has been Section I2223-7' dealing with the time for perfecting
the appeal. It reads-
"The period of time after the entry of the order, judg-
ment, decree, or other matter for review within which the
appeal shall be perfected, unless otherwise provided by
law, is as follows:
Lashly, Judicial Administration and National Defense (1940) 26 AM. B.A.J.
922; Parker, Improving the Administration of Justice (1941) 27 Aml. B.A.J.
1', 71; cf. Harris, Do Ohio Lawyers Want a Streamlined Procedure (1939)
5 O.S.L.J. 330. Specifically on appellate procedure. See Bomberger, A Sim-
plified Code of Appellate Procedure (I934) 9 IND. L.J. 551; Stevenson,
Common Mistakes in Appellate Procedure (1940) 16 IND. L.J. 77; Lavine,
Technical Appellate Rules Cited as Frequent Bar to Hearing on Merits
(1940) 15 CALIF. S.B.J. 264; Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Pro-
cedure (1940) 26 IOWA L. REV. 3.
5 116 Ohio Laws 104 (1935), Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-i et seq.
(effective January I, 1936). See HARRIS, APELLATE COURTS AND APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN OHIO (1933); DAWSON, OHIO APPELLATE REVIEW AND
FORMS (935); MILLER AND GERKEN, COMMENTS ON PROCEDURE IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (1936); SWAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF
OHIO (Cent. Ed. 1936) zzo. See Comment, Changes in Appellate Procedure
(1932) 36 Ohio L. Rep. 424; Harris, New Appellate Procedure in Ohio
(I935) I O.S.L.J. 186; Harris, Ohio Reforms Appellate Procedure (I935)
19 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 29; Stevens, Observations-on the Appellate Procedure
Act (1939) 12 Ohio Bar 491; Comment, Procedural Steps in Ohio Appellate
Practice (940) 15 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 162; (1941) 14 Ohio Bar 89-90.
8 See the remarks of Mr. Herbert E. Ritchie in The Status of the Rule
of Judicial Precedent (940) 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 252 at 254-6.
7 116 Ohio Laws io6 (935). The words "and from probate courts"
were taken out by amendment. I18 Ohio Laws H.B. No. 6 (1939). The
words in the proviso "or sustaining" were added by amendment. 117 Ohio
Laws 615 (1937). The balance of the section, not to be considered however,
reads: "(z) In all other appeals, within ten (io) days. (3) In case of in-
sanity or death of the party after judgment, the court shall have the power
to extend the time of the appeal, an additional twenty (2o) days."
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND TIME FOR APPEAL
"I. In appeals to the supreme court, to courts of ap-
peals, or from municipal courts to courts of common pleas,
within twenty (20) days.
"Provided, that, when a motion for new trial is duly
filed by either party within three days after the verdict or
decision then the time of perfecting the appeal shall not
begin until the entry of the order overruling or sustaining
the motion for new trial. ... "
Although much space could be devoted to consider prob-
lems raised by the main provisions of this section,8 its proviso
"Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. IO26 reads-"Unless otherwise specifically
provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall
be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; except that
the last shall be excluded if it be Sunday." Enck v. Gerding, 63 Ohio St.
175, 65 N.E. 88o (i9oo) (statute applied to allowance of bill of exceptions).
Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11604 provides--"Afl judgments and orders must be
entered on the journal of the court, and specify dearly the relief granted or
order made in the action. The entry must be written into the journal as soon
as the entry is filed with the clerk or directed by the court and shall be jour-
nalized as of the date of the filing of said entry or of the written direction by
the court." Cf. West. v. Meddock, 16 Ohio St. 418 (1865); Lafferty v.
Shinn, 38 Ohio St. 46 (1882) ; Smith v. Smith, 103 Ohio St. 391, I33 N.E.
792 (192); Cox v. Cox, so8 Ohio St. 473, 141 N.E. 2zo (9z3); Hayes
v. Hayes, 117 Ohio St. 323, I58 N.E. 650 (19Z7); The State, Ex Rel.
Industrial Commission v. Day, 136 Ohio St. 477, z6 N.E. (2d) 1014
(1940). But c. Coe v. Erb, 59 Ohio St. z59, 5z N.E. 640 (1898) (judg-
ment not "rendered" within statute, making judgment a lien on lands, till
entered on journal). But as between the parties to an action when a journal
entry is approved by them or their counsel and signed and approved by the
trial judge, the date of filing the entry with the clerk is the date of "entry
of the judgment" within former Sec. I227O, now Sec. 12223-7 and the
appeal must be taken within the given period computed thereafter. The
Amazon Rubber Co. v. Morewood Realty Holding Co., 1O9 Ohio St. 291,
142 N.E. 363 (1924), affirming, I8 Ohio App. 201 (1923); In Re Estate
of Bloch, 17 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 25 (19o8). A nuzc pro tune order cannot
start the time for an appeal to run before an appealable order has actually been
entered. Charles v. Fawley, 71 Ohio St. 50, 72 N.E. 294 (1904); The
Eldridge and Higgins Company v. Barrere, 74 Ohio St. 389, 78 N.E. 516
(i9O6) (will not defeat right to file motion for new trial); The Neracker
Sprinkling Co. v. The Eureka Co., 8 Ohio C.C. 513 (1894), aff'd, 56 Ohio
St. 750, 49 N.E. II1o (1897) (nor bill of exceptions). But it will not
extend the time for review. The Perfection Stove Co. v. Scherer, I 2o Ohio
St. 445, 166 N.E. 376 (i929). The same rules as to the entry of judgment
2z95
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only will be examined. A motion for new trial is defined else-
where in the Code.' The words "duly filed" presumably mean
more than that such motion must be filed within three days,
the time specified elsewhere in the Code," as the proviso itself
requires that the motion be filed within that time. "Duly"
may mean according to the usual practice in filing such motion
for new trial." But common practice should accord only with
the statute. Such motion must be after a "verdict or decision."
"Verdict" refers to a jury trial in an action at law." Is "de-
would seem to be applicable to the determination of when "the entry of the
order overruling or sustaining the motion for new trial" occurs.
What constitutes a judgment or decree has been indicated. The Cincin-
nati Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St. 415, II N.E. 159 (1915); Chandler
& Taylor Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 104 Ohio St. 188, 135 N.E. 62o
(1922); In Matter of Estate of Parmelee, 134 Ohio St. 420, 17 N.E. (2d)
747 (938). "Order" is in Sec. 12223-7 used as "final order," since only
final orders, along with judgments and decrees, are made reviewable. Ohio
Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-3. The definition of "final order" has not been
materially changed since that in Rev. Stat., Sec. 6707, now Ohio Gen. Code
Sec. 12223-2. The clause "unless otherwise provided by law" in Ohio Gen.
Code, Sec. 122z3-3 and 12ZZ3-7, together with Sec. 12223-7(z), the ten
day provision, creates difficulty. Cf. North American Committee v. Bowsher,
13? Ohio St. 599, 9 N.E. (2d) 617 (1937); Saslaw v. Weiss, 133 Ohio St.
496, 14 N.E. (2d) 930 (1938); The State v. Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St. 87,
19 N.E. (2d) 645 (I939); In Matter of Estate of Knechtges, 138 Ohio St.
24, 3z N.E. (2d) 410 (1941); Shaw v. Al Naish Moving & Storage Co.,
55 Ohio App. ZI, 9 N.E. (2d) 300 (1936); Kearns v. Sherrill, 63 Ohio
App. 533, 27 N.E. (2d) 407 (940), af'd, 137 Ohio St. 468, 3o N.E. (2d)
805 (1940); Cryer v. Conard, 64 Ohio App. 351, 28 N.E. (zd) 937
(I94O); Clare & Foster, Inc. v. Diamond S. Electric Co., 66 Ohio App. 376,
34 N.E. (2d) 284 (1940).
9 Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11575.
10 Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11578. It must also be filed at the same term.
.Hoffman v. Knollman, 135 Ohio St. 170, 2o N.E. (zd) 221 (I939). But
Sec. 12223-7 does not specify this additional time requirement as does Sec.
11578?
"1 It might be argued that after judgment or decree in any action, either
at law or in equity, no matter whether issues of law or fact or both be
involved, the lower court should be given an opportunity to reconsider the
case to correct any errors intervening, when a more mature, less hasty con-
sideration may be had, and that the time to perfect an appeal should not
commence until that court has reaffirmed its former judgment or decree by
overruling the motion. Only in this way would the remedy in the lower
court be completely exhausted. See Brown v. Coal Company, 48 Ohio St.
542, 543, 28 N.E. 669 (189i).
12 Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. I1420-9.
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cision" likewise confined to that of the court in an action at law
where a jury is waived? An even more difficult problem arises
in an attempt to answer the question:-What is the "verdict or
decision" after which the motion for new trial is filed and
from which the three-day period for filing it is computed? ' Does
" Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-7 reads- " . .. when a motion for a
new trial is duly filed . . .within three days after the verdict or decision
... " What action of the court or jury will commence the three-day period
running, within which the motion for new trial must be filed? A motion for
new trial not filed following such action of the court or jury would not only
be not duly filed, but would probably be a nullity. When in an action at law
the jury returns a general verdict, Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 1 1599 contemplates
filing a motion for new trial thereafter. But to require the motion to be
filed after a special verdict in accord with Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. i 142o-i4
would deprive the losing party of the right to allege grounds for new trial
under Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11576 involving erroneous application of law
to those facts as found therein. But cf. Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 1 i42o-i± (ver-
dict general or special). If facts are correctly found by a special verdict, no new
trial of facts is needed, error being removed by re-applying the proper law to
them. Difficulty arises in actions either at law or in equity where the court is
the trier of fact. What is the "decision" after which a motion must be filed?
The Industrial Commission v. Musselli, ioz Ohio St. 10, 13o N.E. 32 (92)
held in an action at law tried to the court that "decision" in Ohio Gen. Code,
Sec. 11578 means "judgment" so that the motion for new trial filed within
three days, not of oral announcement by the court of its findings, but of
filing of the judgment entry with the clerk was within the time given by
Sec. 11578. Cf. The City of Cincinnati v. Kilgour, 13 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
415 (i9io); State, on the Relation of Ayres v. Green, 2z Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
321 (1915) (modifying Kilgour case) ; The Colerain Building & Loan Com-
pany v. Hosea, 13 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 244 (C.P. 1912) ; Flowers v. Metcalf,
24 Ohio L. Abs. 169 (C.P. 1937). The Musselli case was based on The
Buckeye Pipe Line Company v. Fee, 6z Ohio St. 543, 57 N.E. 446 (19oo).
See The Eldridge and Higgins Company v. Barrere, 74 Ohio St. 389, 78
N.E. 516 (19o6). Compare Boss v. The Alms & Doepke Co., 17 Ohio App.
315 (1923) (motion for new trial following written opinion of court and over-
ruled by another written opinion held to begin time within which to perfect
bill of exceptions, though final order not entered till after bill filed), with
Cox v. Cox, 34 Ohio App. 192, 17o N.E. 592 (1929) (in action at law
tried to court, motion for new trial filed after announcement of court's
opinion instead of judgment entry held premature); see Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Fidelity & Guarantee Fire Corp., 52 Ohio App. 401, 410, 3 N.E.
(2d) 805, 809 (1935) (finding filed with clerk, but not journalized). One
court has thought that, although the Musslli case permits the filing of a motion
for new trial after judgment entry, this does not preclude the filing of such
motion after findings made by the court, but not entered of record or upon
the journal so that a bill of exceptions perfected within the time after over-
ruling such motion is properly filed. Snyder v. Euclid-io5th Properties Co.,
5 Ohio L. Abs. 742 (1927).
LAW JOURNAL- JUNE, 1941
the fact that a judgment may not be reviewed until a motion for
Confusion has resulted over the effect of Boedker v. The Warren E.
Richards Co., 124 Ohio St. 12, 176 N.E. 66o (1931) on the Musselli case.
The former held that in an action at law tried to the court a judgment
journalized immeditely upon the court's finding does not start the statute
of limitations on appeal running, the time for which commences only after
overruling of a motion for new trial and subsequent entry of a second judg-
ment. The Court said p. 19, "Technically speaking, the finding of the court
would not be a verdict of a jury, but the rights of the parties would be the
same in either event ...
"We have therefore reached the conclusion that the first judgment,
entered within the three-day period, when a judgment could not have been
entered upon the verdict of a jury, was ineffective to start the running of
the limitation." and p. 18, "If the clerk was without power to enter a judg-
ment until after expiration of the time for the filing of a motion for a new
trial, it is difficult to see upon what principle the court could enter the judg-
ment." The Boedker case is not contrary to the Musselli case, because in the
former the "finding" of the court was journalized as a final, appealable judg-
ment. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp., supra.
If the Musselli case requires the losing party to await the entry of judgment
as the "decision" after which the motion for new trial is to be filed, there
could not properly be any talk in the Boedker case about a judgment having
been erroneously and prematurely entered during the time within which a
motion for new trial may be filed. Until that judgment is entered there is
nothing after which to file the motion and the time for filing, of course, will
not run. But the Boedker case wrongly implies that the oral finding of the
court is the act after which a motion for new trial is to be filed. This would
indicate that, had a judgment been journalized after three days from the oral
finding of the court, a motion for new trial following after would have been
too late. Cultice v. DeMaro Realty Co., 16 Ohio L. Abs. 396 (1934)
(written opinion), rehearihg givezz, i6 Ohio L. Abs. 625 (I934) (based on
Musselli case), 79 Ohio L. Abs. 566 (1939) (written opinion does not take
place of jury verdict) ; see McLaughlin v. Rawn, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 6o9, 6 11
(1939). The practice erroneously persists of filing a motion for new trial after
oral decision. See The State, Ex Rel. Industrial Commission v. Day, 136 Ohio
St. 477, 26 N.E. (zd) o 14 (194o). And the Musselli case, although holding
only that a motion for new trial can be filed after judgment entry, undoubted-
ly precludes the filing of such motion after oral finding of the court. The
implication of the Boedker case remains, however, that a written finding of
fact or of fact and law in in action at law tried to the court, filed as part of
the record or entered upon the journal or both, even though not an appeal-
able order, not only starts the three-day period for a motion for new trial,
but is the only action of the court after which a motion can properly be
filed. In other words, for the losing party thereafter to await the entry
of final judgment and then to file his motion would not be filing such motion
"within three days after the verdict or decision" as required by Sec. 12223-7.
Cf. American Society of Chiropractors, Inc. v. Meeker, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 392
(1933); Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Hamburg, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 283 (1935).
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new trial has been overruled mean that such disposition gives
the judgment such degree of finality that the order entered
McLaughlin v. Rawn, supra. (motion for new trial following original decision
of court, part of record, but presumably not journalized). A finding of fact
only, though journalized, would have the same difficulty as a special verdict,
if a motion for new trial must be filed thereafter. But such practice seems
proper.
What is the proper answer in an equity case where Ohio Gen. Code,
Sec. i 1599 has no application? See Anderson v. Local Union No. 413, 29
Ohio L. Abs. 364, 368 (I939) (motion for new trial proper before judg-
ment entered). A good argument can be made that Sec. I22z3-7 draws a
distinction between "order, judgment, decree," on the one hand, and "ver-
dict or decision," on the other, so that, if a finding in an equity case were
made in writing and filed as an entry in the case, the motion for new trial
must be filed within three days thereof and the judgment follows thereafter.
Cf. Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 1158o. But the Anderson case indicated that the
reasoning of the Musselli case also permits a motion for new trial even after
judgment in an action in equity. The former uses the procedure of Sec.
11599 in an action in equity and, if followed, would make unnecessary the
proviso of Sec. 12223-7 because no final, appealable order, judgment, or
decree would be entered until disposition of the motion for new trial. Hence
the time to appeal could in no way be affected by the pendency of such
motion. But Sec 11599 does not prevent entry of a decree during the pen-
dency of the motion. See fn. 28, infra. Therefore to hold that the only action
of the court after which a motion for new trial may properly be filed is the first
or finding entry would not make useless the proviso of Sec. 12223-7. The
Boedker case with the Musselli case may give the losing party a choice to file
his motion for new trial in actions tried by the court in law or equity either
after final judgment or a prior finding entry.
In summary of the law at present, in an action tried to the court, either
in law or equity, the losing party may wait at least until a journal entry to
file his motion for new trial. If such entry is a final judgment, this is the
only act of the court after which a motion can be properly filed. If it is a
finding of fact or of fact and conclusions of law, though not an appealable
order, he probably cannot safely await the entry of judgment thereafter to
file his motion, but must file it after the first entry . In Matter of Estate of
Wuichet, 66 Ohio App. 429, .... N.E. (2d) .. (1940), aff'd, 138 Ohio St.
97, 33 N.E. (2d) 15 (1941); see The Industrial Commission v. Musselli, 102
Ohio St. Io, 16-17, 13o N.E. 32, 34-35 (I9±1); remarks of Oliver G.
Bailey in Trial By Jury (1937) 1I U. Cm. L. REv. 119, 209 at 211; cf.
Rules of Practice of The Courts of Appeals of Ohio (1936) Rule XI. On the
other hand, a motion following this first entry may be premature, if a final
judgment is the only entry after which a motion may properly be filed. But
overruling such motion corrects the error. Compare Cox v. Cox, 34 Ohio
App. 192, 17o N.E. 592 (19±9) (motion for new trial to announced opinion
held premature though overruled), with In re Estate of Lowry, 66 Ohio App.
437, .- N.E. (2d) .. (1941) and Brenholts v. Brenholts, 19 Ohio L. Abs.
309 (1935). A careful lawyer should file two motions.
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thereon is the one from which to appeal?"4 When is such
motion overruled or sustained? 5 What is a "motion for new
trial?" When is it "duly filed?" The answers to these last
two specific questions will answer the broader question-Under
what circumstances will the twenty-day period given for appeal
after the entry of the reviewable order be tolled?
The Supreme Court in two cases, The State, Ex Rel. Long-
manw v. Welsh 6 and Callen v. Schmit,7 has formulated tests
to answer these last three queries. It is the purpose of this
article to analyze these tests and to apply them with the hope
of reducing uncertainty over the proper application of the
proviso of Section 12223-7."
1 Cf. The Liberal Savings & Loan Co. v. The Frankel Realty Co.,
64 Ohio App. 97, 28 N.E. (2d) 367 (1940) (dissent). It has been held
that a notice of appeal stating as the order from which the appeal is taken
the one overruling a motion for new trial brings before the reviewing court
a non-appealable order and cannot be amended under Ohio Gen. Code, Sec.
12223-5 to indicate the prior, appealable decree. Williams v. Braun, 65
Ohio App. 451, 30 N.E. (2d) 363 (194o); Mahaffey v. Stine, 28 Ohio
L. Abs. 361 (1938); Anderson v. Local Union No. 413, 29 Ohio L. Abs.
364 (1939); Cultice v. DeMaro Realty Co., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 566 (1939);
Covington Building & Loan Ass'n v. Yost, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 672 (940).
But cf. Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Ltd., 138 Ohio St.
110, 33 N.E. (2d) 9 (1941) (affirming amendment permitted). Contra:
Mosey v. Hiestand, 138 Ohio St. 249, 34 N.E. (2d) 2Io (1941) (reversing
amendment refused), 7 O.S.L.J. 457.
'" Cf. Wagner v. Long, 133 Ohio St. 41, 11 N.E. (2d) 247 (I937)
(two motions each treated as one for new trial, one overruled, other sus-
tained); The Independent Coal Company v. Quirk, I6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
546 (i9O5), aff'd, 8o Ohio St. 746, 89 N.E. 1120 (1909) (amended
motion overruled separately) ; Bradley v. Herron, 20 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 282
(1912); Thompson v. Rutledge, 32 Ohio App. 537, 168 N.E. 547 (1929);
The J. & F. Harig Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 61 Ohio App. 314, 22 N.E.
(2d) 540 (938); Ross v. Pfeiffer, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 47 (i939); Lynch v.
Lynch, 20 Ohio Op. 294 (C. of A. 194o) (motion to modify alimony held
motion for new trial).
16 133 Ohio St. 244, 13 N.E. (2d) ii9 (1938).
17 137 Ohio St. 479, 30 N.E. (ad) 994 (1940). See also The Liberal
Savings & Loan Co. v. The Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489, 30 N.E.
(2d) 1 (1940).
'" See Stevens, Observations on The Appellate Procedure Act (1939)
i Ohio Bar 491, 500-503. The principles applicable to trials are likewise
applicable to hearings in the court of appeals on questions of law and fact
where a trial ,de novo is given. Cf. Isham v. Fox, 7 Ohio St. 317 (I857); Ide
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In the Longman case the question for determination was
whether the time for perfecting the appeal began to run from
the date on which the entry was filed sustaining the demurrer
and dismissing the petition there involved or from that subse-
quent date on which the application for rehearing and new trial
was denied. In deciding that the former date governed the
court stated that the controlling consideration was "whether a
motion for a new trial was proper, authorized, or effective in
the circumstances." A new trial involving "a reexamination
of an issue of fact in the same court after trial," there was here
"no trial on any issue of fact which would make a motion for
a new trial the necessary or proper procedure." (italics sup-
plied).
The test enunciated in the Cullen case was an interpretation
of the words "duly filed." "A motion for a new trial is duly
filed only when, if granted, it would result in a reexamination
of the issues of fact presented by the pleadings." In other
words, any motion labeled "motion for new trial" and filed
within three days of a verdict, report or decision, regardless of
the nature of the hearing to which it is addressed, the issues
there involved, and the errors alleged as grounds for such
"motion," will not necessarily toll the twenty-day period.
The problem is to harmonize the test of the Longman case
with the more recent and specific standard of the Callen case. 9
Thus the question as to whether the period for seeking appel-
late review is tolled during the pendency of a motion for new
trial may be approached from two angles, whether the motion
v. Churchill, 14 Ohio St. 372 (x863); Turner v. Turner, 17 Ohio St. 449
(1867); The Union Trust Co. v. Lessovitz, izz Ohio St. 4o6, i7i N.E.
849 0930); Dehmer v. Campbell, 124 Ohio St. 634, i8o N.E. 267
(1932); Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-I (3) and i2723-2i (z). Compare
The State, Ex. Rd. Anderson v. Spence, 94 Ohio St. z5, 113 N.E. 1048
(i916), with Boone v. The State, xo9 Ohio St. I, i4i N.E. 841 (1923).
Thus a motion for new trial in the lower court is not necessary to appeal on
questions of law and fact. Garrett v. Hagan, 33 Ohio App. 553, 17o N.E.
x91 (1929); In re Estate of Murphy, 27 Ohio L. Abs. ?21 (1938).
"' The opinion in the Cullen case expressly distinguished the Longman
302 LAW JOURNAL-JUNE, 1941
is (i) effective or (2) necessary, authorized, or proper pro-
cedure. The first raises the distinction between law and equity,
and the second requires a careful analysis into the nature of a
motion for new trial, the causes for which granted, and the need
for a new trial to cure the errors involved.
"DULY FILED" AS MEANING "EFFECTIVE"
It is basic in appellate procedure in Ohio that the only order
from which appeal may be taken is a final order. Hence if no
final order, judgment, or decree has been entered before a
motion for new trial is filed, pending, and overruled, the time
within which to take the appeal not only will not run during
pendency of such motion, but will not begin until a judgment
is entered following the overruling of such motion. Since 19oz
a judgment in a jury case cannot be entered until a motion for
new trial, if filed within three days of the verdict, has been
overruled. Ohio Gen. Code, Section 11599 reads- - -0
"When a trial by jury has been had, judgment
must be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict,
... immediately after the time for the filing of a motion
for a new trial if it has not been filed. When a motion for
a new trial is filed, then such judgment shall be entered
only when the court has sustained such verdict by over-
ruling the motion. Upon such overruling it shall immedi-
ately be entered."
Since the overruling per se of a motion for new trial is not a
final order,2 time for appellate review will not begin even then,
20 95 Ohio Laws 351 (1902), amending, Rev. Stat., Sec. 5326. Before
the amendment a judgment could be entered immediately upon the verdict,
thus starting the limitation period for review even during the pendency of
a motion for new trial. Young v. Shallenberger, 53 Ohio St. 291, 41 N.E.
518 (1895); Dowty v. Pepple, 58 Ohio St. 395, 5o N.E. 923 (1898)
(same rule, though because of absence of trial judge motion for new trial not
overruled till expiration of time for review). The result was unfortunate,
especially when the overruling of a motion for new trial was necessary as a
basis for assigning errors upon appeal. See fn. 42, infra.
21 Young v. Shallenberger, 53 Ohio St. 291, 41 N.E. 518 (1895);
Unkle v. Unkle, 66 Ohio App. 364, 34 N.E. (2d) 71 (1940).
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but will commence only when judgment is thereafter entered,
although in actual practice the same entry overruling the motion
for new trial also enters the final judgment. Hence the ques-
tion of whether a motion for new trial tolls the period for
review is answered here by the fact that during its pendency
no judgment exists to review. Thus the motion for new trial
preventing the entry of judgment may be said to be "effective
in the circumstances. 22
But Section 11599 seems to be limited only to those
instances when "a trial by jury has been had. ' 2' Hence the
Supreme Court took a liberal step in Boedker v. The Warren
E. Richards Co."4 when it applied Section 11599 to actions at
law" where a jury is waived. The court stated at p. 19:-
"The fact that a jury was waived... does not affect the
principle involved. Technically speaking, the finding of
the court would not be the verdict of a jury, but the rights
of the parties would be the same in either event. It will be
observed that the trial court, after the overruling of the
motion for new trial, entered a new judgment without
vacating the former judgment."
The rule of the Boedker case presumably applies only to
actions at law where a jury is waived instead of more inclusively
to all actions triable by jury under Ohio Gen. Code, Section
I 1379, because the syllabus supporting the former view conflicts
with the opinion of the case and the facts themselves involved
2 Cf. Wells, Jr. v. Wells, 105 Ohio St. 471, 138 N.E. 71 (1922).
23 Price v. Hathaway, 16 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 599 (1907), aff'd, 79 Ohio
St. 478, 87 N.E. 1140 (19o9); Morton v. Savin, 17 Ohio App. 51 (1922);
cf. The M. J. Rose Co. v. Ross, 23 Ohio App. 23, 154 N.E. 346 (1926).
24 124 Ohio St. 12, 176 N.E. 66o (1931).
25 The difference in Ohio between a jury and a non-jury case is not
exactly the same as that between an action at law and one in equity. See Ohio
Gen. Code, Sec. 11379; cf. Gunsaullus v. Pettit, 46 Ohio St. 27, 17 N.E. z3I
(1888); Wagner v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio St. 443, 113 N.E. 397 (1916);
Ireland v. Cheney, 129 Ohio St. 527, 196 N.E. z67 (i935). Since the
Constitution of i9iz an action where a right to a jury trial is accorded may
still be appealed if a "chancery" case; i.e., on questions of law and fact.
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only an action at law. But the court deemed that it was draw-
ing the distinction between a right and no right to a jury trial,
the basis of a holding. The law-equity difference was con-
sidered only in relation thereto, making it a dictum as a basis
for the narrower interpretation of the case. The broader view,
furthermore, seems to be the more logical distinction to draw
as well as to accord more easily with the wording of Section
I I599---"When a trial by jury has been had"- thus construed
to read, "When a trial triable by jury has been had." The
more limited interpretation recasts the statute to read, cWhen
a trial at law has been had." This form, however, excludes
merely those few actions in equity "for the recovery of money
only," where a right to a jury trial is afforded by Ohio Gen.
Code, Section 11379, but in these situations Section 11599 will
be inapplicable or not, depending upon whether a jury is or
is not waived, a rather fortuitous result in the light of the
object which the Boedker case was intended to accomplish.
Hence in an action at law, either with or without a jury, the
entry upon the journal of a judgment within the three-day
period after jury verdict or finding entry by the court will be
ineffective to start the statutory period on review. The same is
true when judgment is entered during the pendency of a motion
for new trial filed within time, unless that judgment can be
considered the overruling thereof. 6 The time for appeal then
will begin only upon entry of judgment after overruling such
motion."'
2 6 See fn. 15, supra.
2 The holding of the Boedker case was based on Shelley v. The State,
123 Ohio St. 28, 173 N.E. 730 (9z3) (time to appeal from conviction
runs from judgment entry after overruling motion for new trial). The cases
following the Boedker case are:-The Bruce-MacBeth Engine Co. v. J. P.
Eustis Manufacturing Co., 8 Ohio App. 341 (1917); Baylor v. Killinger,
44 Ohio App. 523, 186 N.E. 512 (i933); Kizner v. Buckeye Union Cas-
ualty Co., 45 Ohio App. 521, 187 N.E. 311 (933) (reason for rule is
motion for new trial needed to review evidence in law action); Midland
Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 49 Ohio App. 243,
197 N.E. 120 (i934); Drucker v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 49 Ohio App.
526, i97 N.E. 492 (1934); Simcoe v. Kampf Herbal Laboratories Co.,
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But a motion for new trial has never been effective to pre-
vent the entry of a judgment or decree in equity cases, the
situation with respect to actions at law as well before 190m, so
that until the passage of the New Appellate Procedure Act,
the pendency of such a motion was held not to toll the statutory
period on review." The same rule has been applied to cases
27 Ohio L. Abs. I4I (1935); see Kelley v. Hermann, 23 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
156, 1 58-6o (1914) (concurring opinion calls for application of Boedker case
to equity action); cf. Klein v. Realty Board Investors, Inc., 48 Ohio App.
235, 19z N.E. 867 (i934) (Boedker case not applicable when defendant's
motion for judgment granted). Cottra: Ross v. Pfeiffer, z9 Ohio L. Abs. 47
(1939) (motion to dismiss). Not only must the motion for new trial be
specifically overruled, but a judgment must be thereafter entered. Otherwise
an appeal is premature. Industrial Commission v. Wodinsky, 130 Ohio St.
267, 198 N.E. 867 (I935); The Columbus Railway, Power & Light Co. v.
The C. & Z. Furniture, Warehouse & Auction Co., 44 Ohio App. i59, 184
N.E. 20 (1932) ; Getzug v. The Belvedere Building Co., 45 Ohio App. 326,
187 N.E. 22 (1933); Reiter v. Ginocchio, 45 Ohio App. 434, 187 N.E.
247 (i933); Cramer v. Cramer, 63 Ohio App. 358, 26 N.E. (2d) 785
(1938); Jones v. Indust. Comm., 31 Ohio L. Abs. 356 (1939). Compare
Kuhn v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ohio App. 279, 26 N.E. (2d) (939)
(motion for new trial not waived by filing notice of appeal) and Paul A. Sorg
Paper Co. v. Hayes, 35 Ohio L. Rep. 512z (I93), with The Liberal Savings
& Loan Co. v. The Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489, 3o N.E. (zd)
1012 (1940). But when no motion for new trial was ever filed after a first
judgment entry, such entry was held voidable only and hence appealable.
The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. The Dixie Terminal Co., 59 Ohio
App. 305, 17 N.E. (2d) 954 (1938). The limitation of "duly filed" might
be read into Sec. I1599 so that, although a motion for new trial is filed
after jury verdict or court's finding, it will not prevent the entry of judgment.
Here the motion could be said not to have been "duly filed" because not
"effective in the circumstances."
28 The leading case is Craig v. Welply, 104 Ohio St. 312, 136 N.E. 143
(1922) (action to set aside conveyance and transfer of stock). Section 11599
was held not to prevent immediate entry of a decree, the date of which
marked the beginning of the time to appeal. A motion for new trial then
does not toll such period. Brown v. Coal Company, 48 Ohio St. 542, 28
N.E. 669 (189i); Fountain Square Building, Inc. v. New Era Cafe, 45
Ohio App, 479, 187 N.E. 364 (933); The Ohio Associates Co. v. Pritz,
48 Ohio App. 567, 194 N.E. 6o9 (1934) (but time for filing bill of excep-
tions runs from overruling motion for new trial); Marquart v. Baltimore &
Ohio Rd. Co., 49 Ohio App. 141, 195 N.E. 396 (I934); The First National
Bank v. The Kittoe Boiler & Tank Co., 6z Ohio App. 411, 24 N.E. (2d)
458 (939) (after New Appellate Procedure Act); Showers v. Prundential
Ins. Co., 24 Ohio L. Abs. 3I2 (1935) (rule of Craig case applied to filing
bill of exceptions); Haines v. Peffer, 3' Ohio L. Abs. 675 (194o). Foun-
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neither actions in equity nor triable to a jury where Section
11599 does not obtain to make unnecessary the question
whether a motion for new trial tolls the time to appeal.29
When Section 12223-7 was passed, it was arguable that the
same rule regarding the time for appeal in cases not governed
by Section 11599 was still applicable. The word "decision" in
"verdict or decision" might well refer to a decision by the court
in an action at law where a jury has been waived. On the other
hand, the proviso thus limited to an action at law, would be
meaningless because no judgment could be entered by reason
of Section 11599 until the overruling of the motion for new
trial, the motion here delaying not the time to seek appellate re-
view, which would otherwise run, but the time to render judg-
ment. Furthermore, the tenor of Section 12223-7 implies that a
judgment has already been entered, the situation applicable to
all except law or jury cases. Therefore "decision" would include
other actions where the court is also the trier of fact."0 But a
dictum of the Supreme Court in The State, Ex Rel. Longmaz
taih Square Buiigg, Ic. v. New Era Cafe, supra. indicated that Sec. I 1599
should be applicable to chancery cases by referring to Ohio Gen. Code, Sec.
I 1421-3 reading that so "far as in their nature applicable, the provisions of
this chapter respecting trials by jury, apply to trials by the court." This
section, however, can not make Sec. 11599 applicable to non-jury cases,
because the latter section does not appear in the Code chapter referred to by
Sec. I1421-3.
2'Wells, Jr. v. Wells, IO 5 Ohio St. 471, 138 N.E. 71 (1922) (action
for divorce where new trial motion held ineffective to delay time to appeal,
even on weight of evidence, since "motion for new trial affects the time when
the limitation within which a petition in error may be filed begins to run
only in those cases where the motion for a new trial prevents the entry of a
judgment"). Heigel v. Heigel, 125 Ohio St. 638, 186 N.E. 99 (932);
In re Guardianship of Gausepohl, 51 Ohio App. 261, 2oo N.E. 520 (935)
(exceptions to account of guardian in probate court), (1937) 7 Ohio Op.
309; Neth v. Neth, 51 Ohio App. 267, 20o N.E. 517 (I935) (petition to
vacate judgment); Borst v. Borst, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 203 (936); Rabold v.
Rabold, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 127 (1936); cf. McGowan v. Rishel, 125 Ohio St.
77, i8o N.E. 542 (932) (dismissal of one defendant for misjoinder).
30 The distinction between law and equity was meant to be abolished
See DAwsON, OHIO APPELLATE REVIEW AND FORMS (1935) 24-25; MILLER
AND GERKEN, COMMENTS ON PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
OHIO (1936) 5-6; Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 102I4.
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v. Welsh, 1 where an application for rehearing and new trial
after dismissal of a petition on demurrer was held not to delay
the time for appeal because no trial of an issue of fact had been
had, concluded that the principle of the Craig and Wells cases
governed. "The application for rehearing and a new trial did
not delay the operative effect of the judgment entry dismissing
the petition, . . .1", These words induced the Court of Appeals
in The First National Bank v. The Kittoe Boiler & Tank Co."
to continue to apply the rule of the Craig case to actions in
equity, in spite of Section 12223-7, thus necessitating the dis-
missal of the appeal, even though filed within twenty days of
overruling a motion for new trial. But another Court of Appeals
in The State, Ex Rel. Squire v. Winch" went the other way
and the Supreme Court affirmed,"5 holding that "decision" is
31 See 133 Ohio St. 244, 246, 13 N.E. (2d) 119, 120 (I938).
'2 What the court probably meant was that, just as the motion for new
trial filed after a finding in equity does not delay entry of the decree, so
here no trial of an issue of fact having been had to make a motion for new
trial "proper procedure," the time for appeal was not delayed during the
pendency of the application.
2362 Ohio App. 411, 25 N.E. (2d) 458 (939). The same Court of
Appeals followed this case in Moock v. The First National Bank, No. i8io
(939); The State of Ohio, Ex Rel. Henry v. Packer, No. 1841 (939);
Baker v. Frazier, No. 1857 (1940). State, Ex Rel. Lavelle v. Ness, No.
16199 (1939) (in mandamus action Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County
followed same rule).
14 62 Ohio App. 16I, 23 N.E. (2d) 642 (939) (action to set aside
conveyance of real estate). A motion for new trial filed after the entry of
the court's judgment was held to delay the time for review. See Hart and
Hart, Review of Ohio Case Law for z939 (1940) 16 Ohio Op. 294, 313;
The Liberal Savings & Loan Co. v. The Frankel Realty Co., 64 Ohio App.
97, 28 N.E. (2d) 367 (1940); Williams v. Braun, 65 Ohio App. 451, 453,
30 N.E. (2d) 363, 364 (1940); Mahaffey v. Stine, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 361,
36z (1938); Anderson v. Local Union No. 413, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 364,
366-69 (939) ; Cultice v. DeMaro Realty Co., 29 Ohio L. Abs. 566, 569
(939); McLaughlin v. Rawn, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 609, 61I (939); Coving-
ton Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Yost, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 672, 674 (940);
Haines v. Peffer, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 675, 677 (1940).
25 The State, Ex Rel. Squire v. Winch, 137 Ohio St. 479, 30 N.E.
(2d) 994 (1940). The court said at pp. 482-3, "If the process of simplifi-
cation is to be accomplished the language of the act must be accorded a liberal
construction. With these premises in mind what distinction does this section
recognize between an action at law and a suit in chancery with reference to
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not restricted to actions at law, but here includes "a decree in a
suit in chancery." The result is that the same time for appeal
applies to cases either in law or equity (including presumably
the special actions in divorce and probate)" when a motion for
new trial is "duly filed," notwithstanding the query raised by
the words in The Liberal Savings & Loan Co. v. The Frankel
Realty Co." This case, decided the same day as the Cullen case,
held without "determining whether a party may perfect his
appeal within twenty days after the overruling of the motion
for a new trial in a chancery case if he elects to wait" that an
appeal on questions of law and fact may be taken within twenty
days after the journal entry of final judgment and during the
pendency of a motion for new trial, such motion thereby being
waived. Although the distinction between actions at law and
those in equity with respect to the effect of the pendency of a
motion for new trial upon the time for appellate review has
been abolished, a motion for new trial must be considered in
the perfecting of an appeal? More exactly, what it meant by the wording
"verdict or decision?" Is the use of the word "decision" restricted to
actions at law? A close study of this and cognate sections discloses nothing
to indicate that the term is employed in other than its broad, generic sense
of a final determination of the rights of the parties in an action. Therefore,
to hold that the word "decision" excludes either a judgment in an action at
law or a decree in a suit in chancery would require not only judicial legislation
but also the revival of a technical and confusing distinction that could serve
no useful purpose." Cf. Couk v. The Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp.,
Ltd., 138 Ohio St. 110, 33 N.E. (zd) 9 (1941) (jurisprudence to find
expression in absolute justice, not refinements of procedural technique).
a8 Weeden v. Weeden, II6 Ohio St. 524, i56 N.E. 9o8 (927)
(divorce); The Exposition Building and Loan Co. v. Spiegel, i z Ohio C.C.
761 (1893) (probate); cf. Trimble v. Koch, 26 Ohio St. 435 (1875); Ohio
Gen. Code, Sec. 10501-72. Municipal courts are usually given the same
power to grant new trials as are the courts of common pleas. Cf. Ohio Gen.
Code, Sections 1558-18 (Cincinnati); 1558-67 (Columbus); 1579-28
(Cleveland); 1579-63 (Dayton); 1579-104 (Hamilton); 1579-145
(Youngstown); 1579-210 (Alliance); 1579-245 (Sandusky); 1579-302
(Toledo); 1579-344 (Zanesville); etc.
37 137 Ohio St. 489, 3o N.E. (2d) 1012 (i94o), affirming, 64 Ohio
App. 97, 28 N.E. (d) 367 (1940). Would a notice of appeal filed over
twenty days from entry of the decree be such a waiver of a pending motion
for new trial that the twenty-day period would not be tolled because of the
non-existence of such motion?
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the light of the additional tests of whether such motion is
necessary, proper, or authorized procedure."
11 In The State, Ex Rel. Squire v. Winch, 6z Ohio App. 161, 23 N.E.
(2d) 642 (1939) the Court said at p. i62--"The filing of the motion for
a new trial within three days of the recording of the decree by the trial court
was not only a proper but a necessary procedure, in an attempt to secure a
reexamination of issues of fact after conclusion of the trial in chancery, and
the entry of the judgment." This might be interpreted to mean that a
motion for new trial is essential as a basis for an appeal on questions of law
and fact, "re-examination of issues of fact" meaning re-examination in the
appellate court. The conclusion, however, was rendered unsound by the
Liberal Savings & Loaa Co. case holding that an appeal on questions of law
and fact can be taken during the pendency of such motion, which is thereby
waived. See McLaughlin v. Rawn, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 609 (1939) at p. 611-
"Under the new procedural act, Sec. 12223-7, GC motion for new trial may
be filed in chancery cases where the claimed errors are predicated upon such
matters as would be manifest through a bill of exceptions, . . . " Is ti is an
implication that this situation may be the only one where a motion for new
trial filed after decree in equity is permissible?
"Effective" might also be interpreted to mean that there exists a reas-
onable chance that the trial court will grant such motion. Such interpretation,
however, would cause increased litigation.
Other types of motions in the nature of applications for rehearing do
not suspend the time to appeal from the order, judgment, or decree to which
directed. The Board of Commissioners v. Harshman, lO Ohio St. 529, 130
N.E. 935 (1920) (modification of decree on contempt proceedings); The
State, Ex Rel. Kriss v. Richards, ioz Ohio St. 455, 132 N.E. 23 (1921)
(motion to vacate entry overruling motion for new trial) ; Wyant v. Russell,
1o9 Ohio St. 167, 142 N.E. 144 (923) (same); City of Dayton v. Public
Utilities Commission, iii Ohio St. 476, 145 N.E. 849 (1924) (even though
application for rehearing must be filed to review order of Commission); The
State, Ex Rel. Lanker v. Kelsey, 126 Ohio St. 599, 186 N.E. 508 (933).
Compare Duncan v. The State, Ex Rel. Williams, 119 Ohio St. 453, 164
N.E. 527 (1928) (motion to certify as conflict), with Harter v. Marsh,
118 Ohio St. 145, 16o N.E. 614 (1928) (time to file appeal in Supreme
Court does not begin till certification allowed). The South Cleveland Bank-
ing Company v. Nachtrieb, 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 504 (1905) (motion to
set aside judgment); Woodward v. Brockell, z Ohio App. 37 (1913) (order
of re-reference); The American Bank v. Sethman, 25 Ohio App. 81, 157
N.E. 423 (1926) (motion to vacate foreclosure decree); Neighbors v. The
Thistle Down Co., 26 Ohio App. 324, 159 N.E. iii (1926) (motion to
remove receiver); Friedman v. Brown, 35 Ohio App. 450, 172 N.E. 565
(1930) (motion to change date of judgment entry); Eaton v. Robison,
4 7 OhioApp. 436, 197 N.E. 132 (1933), aff'd, 127 Ohio St. 587, 19o N.E.
249 (1934) (order confirming sale and distribution by receiver) ; The Equity
Savings & Loan Co. v. Schwartz, 57 Ohio App. 392, 14 N.E. (2d) 359
(1937) (motion to vacate foreclosure decree); Andrews v. Ackerman Coal Co.,
59 Ohio App. 65, 17 N.E. (2d) 247 (937) (rehearing order granting new
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The second approach of the Longman case is whether a
motion for new trial is "proper [or] authorized ... in the cir-
cumstances" or "necessary or proper procedure."39 Since a new
trial); The J. & F. Harig Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 61 Ohio App. 314, 27
N.E. (2d) 540 (1938) (second motion for judgment on pleadings); Sullivan
v. Cloud, 6z Ohio App. 46Z, 24 N.E. (2d) 625 (939) (judgment vacated
after appeal); Tracy-Wells Co. v. McKay, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 507 (1938)
(overruling motion for new trial filed too late). But under circumstances where
justice demands it a motion in the nature of an application for rehearing will
delay the time to appeal. The Propeller Ogontz v. Wick, iz Ohio St. 333
(i86i) (motion to reinstate appeal); Geiger v. The American Seeding Ma-
chine Co., 1Z4 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (I93I) (leave to file amended
pleadings on court's own motion), (1931) 5 U. CIN. L. REv. 502; Baldwin
v. Lint, 53 Ohio App. 349, 5 N.E. (zd) 413 (1936) (motion to vacate sum-
mary judgment granted while attorney away); see Wilder v. McDonald, 18
Ohio C.C. 232, 233 (1899), aff'd, 63 Ohio St. 383, 59 N.E. io6 (I9OO)
(time for appeal delayed if judgment modified or set aside); cf. Rules of
Practice of The Courts of Appeals of Ohio (1936) Rule XI; Central National
Bank v. Mills, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 169 (1940); Horth v. American Aggregates
Corp., 20 Ohio Op. 76 (C. of A. i94o).
" The Longma= case has been described as follows: "The privilege of
filing same [motion for new trial] is one which may not be denied, if the
motion may serve any useful purpose. If it does not serve a useful purpose, it
is wholly unavailing to extend the period for filing a notice of appeal." The
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. The Dixie Terminal Co., 59 Ohio App.
305, 17 N.E. (2d) 954 (1938) at p. 307. "When the motion involves
merely iteration of a legal right fully preserved by previous action, it becomes
superfluous and unnecessary and the [rule of the Longman case applies]. The
action on the superfluous motion being unavailing to toll the limitation
provided for the notice of appeal, the appeal is dismissed." The J. & F.
Harig Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 61 Ohio App. 314, 22 N.E. (zd) 540
(1938) at p. 320. "In this respect the instant case must be distinguished
from [the Longmanz case], wherein it was determined that the filing of a
motion for a new trial following a judgment which sustained a demurrer was
neither necessary nor proper, because there had been no trial upon any issue
of fact." The State, Ex Rel. Squire v. Winch, 6z Ohio App. 16i, 23 N.E.
(2d) 642 (i939) at p. i62. The essence of the Loivgman, case "lies not in
the course of its discussion of what should control, but lies in what it terms
'our conclusions'," that the Craig and Wells cases govern. The First National
Bank v. The Kittoe Boiler & Tank Co., 6z Ohio App. 411, 24 N.E. (2d)
458 (I939) at p. 412 "The principal case, in view of the language of the
opinion, makes these two earlier cases applicable [Craig and Wells cases]
under the New Appellate Practice Act and establishes the rule that the filing
of a motion for a new trial stays the time for filing of the notice of appeal
only, as was said in the Wells case, when the motion for a new trial prevents
310
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trial by statutory definition "involves a reexamination of an
issue of fact in the same court after trial" and since in the present
case the demurrer "challenged merely the legal sufficiency of
the pleadings," there having been "no trial on any issue of
fact," the motion for new trial in that case was neither necessary
nor proper procedure. Although the query may be raised-
whether the crucial fact was that there had been no trial or
that there had been no issue of fact-the latter is what the Court
had in mind, since a trial--"a judicial examination of the issues,
... of law..., in an action ... " had been had and the Court in
redefining a new trial stressed the words "an issue of fact."4
the entry of judgment. That situation, by virtue of Section 11599 General
Code, only occurs in jury cases, and in all other cases, the time for filing an
appeal begins to run from the journalizing of the judgment or decree in the
lower court." Hart and Hart, Review of Ohio Case Law for z93 8 (1939)
13 Ohio Op. 340 at p. 355. "The facts in the[Longman case] are so
dissimilar that we do not consider it controlling. There was in fact no trial
and no motion for a new trial in that case." The Liberal Savings & Loan
Co. v. The Frankel Realty Co., 64 Ohio App. 97, z8 N.E (.zd) 367 (940)
at p. oz. "We ... find the [Longman case] pertinent and determinative."
Mandevers v. Peerless Stove & Mfg. Co., 28 Ohio L. Abs. 255 (938) at
p. z56 (motion to arrest from jury and for judgment on pleadings and open-
ing statement). "There could have been no necessity of the reconsideration
of the determination of the facts [in the Longman case] because there was
no dispute, the cause having been submitted on an agreed statement of facts.
The only question before the court was the correctness of the application of
the law to the conceded facts and issue of law only. In this situation there
was no place for motion for new trial in the view which our Supreme Court
has heretofore taken of the place and purpose of such a motion." Anderson
v. Local Union No. 413, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 364 (i939) at p. 369. "Thus
it must be emphasized that a very real difference exists between the cases in
which a mere question of law is presented by the record as upon a demurrer
... and those cases in which 'an issue of fact' within the meaning of Section
11575 is subject to re-examination." Stevens, Observations on the Appellate
Procedure Act (1939) 1z Ohio Bar 491 at p. 502. The Supreme Court
passed final judgment on the effect of the Longman case by saying: "How-
ever, this view [that the rule of the Longmat case applies] disregards the
distinguishing feature that in the [Longman case] there concededly was no
trial on any issue of fact whatsoever. The demurrer of course presented a
question of law alone." Cullen v. Schmit, 137 Ohio St. 479, 30 N.E. (2d)
994 (1940) at p. 482.
" Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. I1376--"A trial is a judicial examination of
the issues, whether of law or of fact, in an action or proceedings." Section
I 157 5-"CA new trial is a re-examination, in the same court, of an issue of
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This line of reasoning induced the Court of Appeals in Man-
fact, after a verdict by a jury, a report of a referee or master, or a decision
by the court." But af. 55 Ohio Laws 81 (1858) (second trial as of right in
place of appeal), repealed, Rev. Stat., Sec. 1753 (I88o). Section 11377-
"Issues arise on the pleadings where a fact or a conclusion of law, is main-
tained by one party and controverted by the other. They are of two kinds:
(i) Of law. (z) Of fact." Section I 1378---"An issue of fact arises: (i) Upon
a material allegation in the petition denied by the answer. (2) Upon a set-off,
counterclaim, or new matter, presented in the answer and denied by the
reply. (3) Upon material new matter in the reply, which is to be considered
as controverted by the adverse party without further pleading." Section
I 1303 "The only pleadings in civil actions are: . . ." petition, answer (cross-
petition), reply, and demurrer to any one of the above. Section II 3 70--"A
motion is an application for an order, addressed to a court or judge, by a
party to a suit or proceedings, or one interested therein." Section I iz37-
"An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, involving process,
pleadings, and ending in a judgment or decree, by which a party prosecutes
another for the redress of a legal wrong, enforcement of a legal right, or the
punishment of a public offence." Thus a motion for new trial made and
overruled is not necessary to review evidence heard at a special proceeding
commenced by affidavits instead of pleadings because not a trial, as pointed
out in Minnear v. Holloway, 56 Ohio St. 148, 154, 46 N.E. 636, 637
(1897). Phelps v. Schroder, z6 Ohio St. 549 (1875) (election contest);
The Pittsburgh, Cleveland & Toledo Railroad Company v. Tod, 72 Ohio
St. 156, 74 N.E. 17Z (905) (preliminary question in appropriation pro-
ceeding); The Dayton & Union Railroad Company v. The Dayton & Mun-
cie Traction Company, 72 Ohio St. 429, 72 N.E. I95 (I9O5); Charles
Beitman & Co. v. McKenzie, 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 403 (1884), aff'd, 17 Ohio
L. Bull. 405 (887) (motion to discharge attachment); Mercantile Trust
Company v. Etna Iron Works, 4 Ohio C.C. 579 (1 89o) (to set aside appoint-
ment of temporary receiver); Stone v. Bank, 8 Ohio C.C. 636 (1894) (to
dissolve attachment); Acomb v. Clark, 16 Ohio C.C. 66z (1898) (dismissal
for want of jurisdiction); Thomas v. Mangus, 2 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 554
(1904) (attachment); Cecil v. Grant, 6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 65 (905);
Schottenfels v. Massman, 16 Ohio App. 78 (192i) (motion to strike peti-
tion); Snyder v. The New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co., 24 Ohio
App. 514, 157 N.E. 427 (1927), aff'd, I18 Ohio St. 72, 16o N.E. 6i 5(1928), aft'd, 278 U.S. 578, 49 S. Ct. 176 (1929) (appropriation pro-
ceedings); Slater v. Brown, 43 Ohio App. 497, 183 N.E. 393 (1932)
(motion to vacate judgment, time to file bill of exceptions not extended);
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Hill, 48 Ohio App. 418, 194 N.E. 397 (934)
(motion for costs); Laub v. The Warren Guaranty Title & Mortgage Co.,
54 Ohio App. 457, 8 N.E. (zd) 258 (936) (motion to confirm sale of
realty on mortgage foreclosure); Hoffman v. Weiland, 64 Ohio App. 467,
29 N.E. (2d) 33 (940) (order in aid of execution). But occasionally a
motion for new trial has been held necessary to review the evidence in special
proceedings. Snyder v. Wanamaker, 17 Ohio C.C. 184 (898) (motion to
set aside settlement of action) ; Whitman v. Sheets, 20 Ohio C.C. I (1899)
(motion to quash service); Meachem v. Meachem, i i Ohio L. Abs. 147
(193x) (motion for temporary alimony).
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devers v. Peerless Stove & Mfg. Co." to make the distinction
as to the propriety of a motion for new trial between the situa-
tion where a question of fact and a question of law was involved
in the first trial. There the petition in an action at law was
defective, but was not attacked by demurrer. The case having
proceeded to trial, a jury having been impaneled, counsel for
plaintiff having made his opening trial statement, and some
preliminary testimony having been introduced, an oral motion
was interposed to arrest the case from the jury and to render
judgment in favor of defendant upon the pleadings and such
opening statement. The trial court sustained the motion to
dismiss the petition, the entry being journalized. A motion for
new trial was overruled three months later and notice of appeal
was filed the same day. The Longman case was held control-
ling. The court in the Cullen case may further this solution in
pointing out therein that "at the conclusion of the trial the
court arrested the evidence from the consideration of the jury
and rendered a judgment for the defendants on the theory
that as a matter of law the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
41 28 Ohio L. Abs. 255 (1938). The report of the case reads that the
motion for new trial was filed March 1, while the journal entry was dated
March 30. Presumably April I is meant. Although the appeal was here
dismissed as not having been filed in time, the court, pointing out that the
petition did not state a cause of action, in effect decided the case on the
merits. The query may be raised as to whether the same procedural rule
would have been followed if granting the motion for judgment below had
been error. This case is subject to several interpretations. (1) The one
assumed herein is that the motion testing the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
case on the petition and opening statement presents to the court only an issue
of law as opposed to an issue of fact, no matter when raised during the trial.
(z) But the court may have felt that no trial begins before introduction of
evidence by plaintiff to make a trial, if granted on motion, a "new trial."
(3) Although a first trial may have here begun, the court declaring that the
opening statement did not aid the petition may have considered that the
trial was only a hearing on demurrer, exactly like the Longman, case. (4) Or
an issue of fact can occur only when the facts are taken, not from the petition
or opening statement, but from evidence actually introduced. (5) The last
view is that a re-examination of an issue of fact on motion for new trial can
occur only when the disputed issues of fact have actually been resolved by
the trier thereof at the first trial.
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from the defendants upon the evidence in the record. However
[by her motion for new trial] the plaintiff asks a reexamination
of the facts as well as the law, and one of her assignments of
error involves the admission and exclusion of evidence.. [which
errors rendered the facts] not correctly portrayed by the present
record." The implication was thereby raised that a motion for
new trial seeking a reconsideration only of the ruling of the
court in arresting the evidence from the jury and rendering
judgment might not have been "duly filed."" 2 The State, Ex
42 This implication leads to one possible, but limited meaning of "neces-
sary"-"duly filed" as "necessary" to save errors alleged for appellate review.
The "necessary or proper procedure" test of the Longman case, re-emphasized
by the words of the Court of Appeals in The State, Ex Rd. Squire v. Winch,
6z Ohio App. 16I, 23 N.E. (zd) 642 ('939), that in the Longman case a
motion for new trial "was neither necessary nor proper, because there had been
no trial upon any issue of fact" raises the question whether a motion for new
trial will toll the statutory period for review only in those situations where
such motion is a prerequisite to raise on appeal alleged errors, grounds for
such motion. When such is not the case, the motion may be considered merely
a dilatory tactic, a matter of form, serving no useful purpose, and hence not
"necessary procedure" to delay the time for appellate review. The test of
the Gullen case, where "a motion for a new trial is duly filed only when, if
granted, it would result in a reexamination of the issues of fact presented by
the pleadings" may mean to distinguish the situation when at the first trial
such issues were actually resolved by the trier of facts and when, although the
first trial was to settle disputed issues of fact, judgment was entered, not on
the facts as found by the trier, but as assumed for the purpose of testing the
legal sufficiency of plaintiff's or defendant's case to date. In other words, no
re-examination of issues of fact can result on granting a motion for new trial
unless such issues were once "examined"-actually resolved-by a trier of fact
instead of being taken from such trier and found in some other way for the
purpose of applying the law thereto. Hence a trial ending, not in a finding
of disputed factual issues, but in verdict and judgment as a matter of law,
is not such an examination of "the issues of fact presented by the pleadings"
that the trial granted after a hearing upon motion for new trial could be
called a "reexamination" thereof. Cf. Cullen v. Schmit, 137 Ohio St. 479,
30 N.E. (2d) 994- (1940) at 481-2; Mandevers v. Peerless Stove & Mfg.
Co., 28 Ohio L. Abs. 255 (938) ; See Stevens, Observations On the Appellate
Procedure Act (939) iz Ohio Bar 491, 5o2 (distinction between question
of law and question of fact as basis for effectiveness of motion for new trial
to delay time for appeal). In general when the appellate court is asked to
review the facts on the weight of the evidence, the trial court must have been
likewise requested in a motion for new trial, but, when an application of law
to facts is reviewed on appeal, such motion in the trial court is unnecessary.
Hence a motion for new trial may be "duly filed" only when "necessary"
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Rel. Longman v. Welsh was distinguished on the ground that
no trial was there had on any issue of fact, the demurrer pre-
senting "a question of law alone," the Court thus stressing the
absence of an issue of fact, not the absence of any trial.
The approach of the CuIlen case in answering the question
of when a motion for new trial is "duly filed" appears to be the
to save errors for review. Thus to review a verdict, report, or decision resolv-
ing disputed factual issues on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, a
motion for new trial designating ground 6 of Section I 1576 must have been
overruled. Kepner's Administrator v. Snively's Administrator, 19 Ohio 296
(1850); Westfall v. Dungan, 14 Ohio St. 276 (i863); Ide v. Churchill,
14 Ohio St. 372 (1863); Hoffman v. W. Y. M. Gordon & Bro., 15 Ohio
St. 2I1 (1864); Randall v. Turner, 17 Ohio St. 26z (1867); Turner v.
Turner, 17 Ohio St. 449 (1867); Spangler v. Brown, 26 Ohio St. 389
(1875); Everett, Weddell & Co. v. Sumner, 32 Ohio St. 56z (1877); Union
Insurance Company v. McGookey, 33 Ohio St. 555 (1878); Railroad Com-
pany v. Kassen, 49 Ohio St. 230, 31 N.E. zS2 (i89z); The State, Ex Red.
Porter v. Clark, iz Ohio St. 133, 146 N.E. 8i 5 (925); Emery v. City
of Toledo, 121 Ohio St. 257, 167 N.E. 889 (1979); Chapek v. The City
of Lakewood, ii Ohio App. 203 (1919); Rowe v. Rowe, i6 Ohio App. iSo
192Z); Cox v. Cox, 34 Ohio App. 192, 17o N.E. 592 (i9z9); Murray v.
Brown, 46 Ohio App. 136, 188 N.E. 15 (i933); Gearhart v. Columbus
Ry., Power & Light Co., 65 Ohio App. 225, z9 N.E. (zd) 6zi (940);
cf. Deveraux v. Hutchinson, 21 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 462 (1907), aff'd, 78
Ohio St. 415, 85 N.E. 1124 (1908) (motion for new trial needed to review
special findings of fact even though general verdict rendered for appellant).
An appeal on questions of law being allowed from a chancery case, Stuckey v.
The New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co., 58 Ohio App. 14, 15 N.E. (zd)
975 (1937), to review the evidence here a motion for new trial made and
overruled is likewise necessary. Turner v. Turner, supra; Spangler v. Brown,
supra. To hold that a motion for new trial here would not delay the period
for review would result, when none is filed, either in limited review or no
review at all where the factual finding is the only error claimed. A motion
for new trial overruled is likewise required to re-examine on appeal factual
findings, even when no conflict in the evidence exists, since minds may differ
in the ultimate finding, consisting of inferences drawn from such evidence.
The Bank of Virginia v. The Bank of Chillicothe, i6 Ohio 170 (1847);
Spangler v. Brown, supra; Chapek v. The City of Lakewood, supra (applied
when verdict directed for defendant). Even though only one inference is
possible from the testimony of undisputed witnesses, because the trier of fact
may have disbelieved them, a motion for new trial is also needed here to
review the factual findings. Werk v. Voss, 8 Ohio Dec. Repr. 205 (Dist. Ct.
188i). But to draw a distinction for purposes of computing time for appeal
between findings of fact and conclusions of law would be unfortunate because
of the shadowy line between them. Cf. The C. L. & N. Railway Co. v.
Kellsall, 6 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 487 (Sup. Ct. 19o8), aff'd, The Cincinnati,
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"proper procedure" test, for filing such motion in accordance
with the statutory definition certainly must be authorized or
proper. Such approach is the logical one of finding out the
nature of such motion as defined elsewhere in the Code, Section
I 1575. But along with an examination of this statutory defini-
tion several other sections of the Code should also be examined
Lebanon & Northern Railway Co. v. Kelsall, 8z Ohio St. 388, 92 N.E. i1lo
(I9Io). Furthermore, other types of error, grounds for new trial, must be
considered upon motion for new trial to preserve them for review. Hills v.
Ludwig, 46 Ohio St. 373, 24 N.E. 596 (1889) (request for charges re-
fused); see The Toledo & Ohio Central Railway Co. v. Marsh, 17 Ohio
C.C. 379, 383 (1898) (excessive damages, refusal to charge). To be con-
trasted with review on the weight of the evidence, presenting "issues of fact '
are the instances where a motion for new trial overruled is not necessary for
appellate review. Thus where no evidence exists fairly tending to establish
facts, the existence of which are essential to make out a cause of action or
defense and raising an error of law for want of proof, The Travelers'
Indemnity Co. v. The M. Werk Co., 33 Ohio App. 358, 169 N.E. 584
(1929); see Turner v. Turner, 17 Ohio St. 449, 452 (1867); The Western
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Fairburn, 99 Ohio St. 141, 142, 124 N.E. 131 (1918)
(weighing evidence as against no evidence distinguished); cf. The Medina
County Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Palm, 5 Ohio St. 107 (1855).
When the court makes a finding of fact separately from conclusions of law,
Lockwood v. Krum, 34 Ohio St. 1 (1878); Miller v. Douglas, 13 Ohio C.C.
439, 14 Ohio C.C. i 4 (1897), the reason being that the question involved,
whether the conclusions of law follow from the facts as found as an applica-
tion of law to facts, is a question of law. The Cincinnati Gas & Electric
Company v. Archdeacon, 8o Ohio St. 27, 88 N.E. 125 (i9o9); State v.
Wirick, 8I Ohio St. 343, 9o N.E. 937 (19io); Luntz v. Stern, 135 Ohio
St. 225, 2o N.E. (2d) 241 (1939); Yahraus v. Stevens, 29 Ohio L. Rep. 81
(1929). When the record contains an agreed statement of facts, H. W.
Brown & Co. v. D. W. Mott & Brothers, zz Ohio St. 149 (1871); McGon-
nigle v. Arthur, 27 Ohio St. 251 (1875); In Matter of Estate of Hinton,
64 Ohio St. 485, 6o N.E. 6z1 (i9Ol); Bettman v. Northern Insurance Co.,
134 Ohio St. 341, I6 N.E. (2d) 472 (1938). Likewise the granting or
refusing to grant a motion for directed verdict, to declare a nonsuit, to arrest
the evidence from the jury and for judgment, or for judgment upon the
pleadings or pleadings and opening statement, or a demurrer to the evidence
presents questions of law. The Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton, i iS
Ohio St. io6, i6o N.E. 629 (1928); Inglish v. Industrial Commission,
125 Ohio St. 494, 182 N.E. 31 (1932); Klein v. Realty Board Investors,
Inc., 48 Ohio App. 235, i92 N.E. 867 (1934); Oster v. The Columbian
National Fire Insurance Company, z9 Ohio L. Rep. 239 (i929); cf. Cornell
v. Morrison, 87 Ohio St. 215, oo N.E. 817 (1912); Durbin v. The Hum-
phrey Co., 133 Ohio St. 367, 14 N.E. (2d) 5 (I938); Gerend v. City of
Akron, 63 Ohio App. 78, 25 N.E. (2d) 363 (1939), reversed onz other
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to discover when a motion for new trial is authorized or "proper
procedure" and hence "duly filed."
"Proper Procedure." Thus upon carrying this approach a
step further a motion for new trial would seem to be "duly
filed" when filed for any of the causes for which a new trial
will be given by the trial court, as enumerated in Section 11576,
for this is part of the privilege given to a party defeated at the
grounds, 137 Ohio St. 527, 30 N.E. (2d) 987 (1940). This conclusion
results from the process followed in passing upon such motions or demurrer
and described in Ellis v. The Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, 4 Ohio
St. 6z8 (1855) at 645-6, "When all the evidence offered by the plaintiff has
been given and a motion for nonsuit is interposed, a queston of law is pre-
sented, whether the evidence before the jury tends to prove all the facts in-
volved in the right of action, and put in issue by the pleadings. All that the
evidence in any degree tends to prove, must be received as fully proved....
The motion involves not only an admission of the truth of the evidence, but
the existence of all the facts which evidence conduces to prove. It thus concedes
to plaintiff everything that the jury could possibly find in his favor and
leaves nothing but the question whether, as a matter of law, each fact indis-
pensable to the right of action has been supported by some evidence." The
degree of proof necessary, scintilla or sufficient so that the facts and reasonable
inferences deducible therefrom are such that the jury as fair-minded men
could reasonably arrive at different conclusions, makes no difference. Cf.
Hamden Lodge No. 517 v. The Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 17 Ohio St. 469,
189 N.E. 246 (I934) (scintilla rule abolished), (0934) 33 MICH. L. REV.
136. Consequently a motion for new trial is not necessary in these cases to raise
on review the alleged error. The Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton,
supra; Inglish v. Industrial Commission, supra; Klein v. Realty Board Inves-
tors, Inc., supra; Oster v. The Columbian National Fire Insurance Company,
supra; see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corp., 52 Ohio
App. 401, 411, 3 N.E. (zd) 805, 809 0935). To predicate error on admis-
sion or rejection of evidence and on the charge or failure to charge a jury, no
motion for new trial is needed. Earp v. The Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and
Chicago Railroad Company, i2 Ohio St. 6zi (86 i); Seagrave v. Hall,
io Ohio C.C. 395 (1895); McAlpin v. Clark, ii Ohio C.C. 5Z4 (1896),
aff'd, 56 Ohio St. 786, 49 N. E. 1112 (1897); cf. The State v. Langen-
stroer, 67 Ohio St. 7, 65 N.E. 15z (i9o) (impaneling jury and introduc-
tion of testimony before justice of peace). But cf. Cullen v. Schmit, 137
Ohio St. 479, 3o N.E. (2d) 994 (940) (motion for new trial on ground
of admission and exclusion of evidence held "duly filed.") The Cullen case,
furthermore, held that a motion filed on this ground is "duly filed" even
when the first trial did not resolve disputed factual issues. Consequently this
case is an exception to the rule suggested by the interpretation herein posed.
Although this interpretation of "duly filed" in the light of the Longman case
is conceivable, it is in addition too narrow and should not be adopted.
318 LAW JOURNAL-JUNE, 1941
first trial.4" In general these causes contemplate the situation
where for some reason or other the one seeking to vacate a
former verdict, report or decision has not received a fair trial,
substantial justice not having been done.4 Two of the statutory
grounds in particular must be analyzed in the light of the
implication of the Cullen case-a reconsideration of an issue of
fact as compared to a reconsideration of an issue of law-in
determining whether a motion for new trial is "duly filed."
They are Section 11576 (6)---"That the verdict, report, or
decision is . . . contrary to law" and Section 11576 (8)-
"Error of law occuring at the trial and excepted to by the party
making the application." In Weaver v. The Colwmbus, Shaw-
nee & Hocking Valley R'y Co. 5 Judge Bradbury said of sub-
division 6 of Section 11576 at p. 495:-
"This ground that the 'verdict, report, or decision'
is contrary to law is broad and comprehensive. It would
seem to include any error of law committed by the trial
court in the course of a trial prejudicial to the losing
party." (italics supplied.)
In determining what causes for new trial fall within sub-
sections 6 and 8, Ohio Gen. Code, Section 11564 should be
considered as an analogous statute, since it contemplates the
filing of a motion for new trial based upon certain objections
therein specifically enumerated. Thus the pendency of a
motion for new trial under this statute, listing as grounds of
error the action of the court in giving and refusing to give
certain special instructions, delays the time within which the bill
of exceptions must be taken until overruling of such motion."
Likewise, where a motion for new trial assigned as error the
" See Weaver v. The Columbus, Shawnee & Hocking Valley R'y Co.,
55 Ohio St. 491, 496, 45 N.E. 717, 719 (1896); The Dayton & Union
Railroad Company v. The Dayton & Muncie Traction Company, 72 Ohio
St. 429, 436, 74 N.E. I95, 197 (1905).
44 Cf. Hinton v. McNeil, 5 Ohio 509 (I83Z).
45 55 Ohio St. 491, 45 N.E. 717 (1896).
46 Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Wright, 54 Ohio St. I8i, 43 N.E.
688 (1896).
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sustaining of a motion to arrest the testimony from the jury
and to render judgment for defendant, the bill of exceptions
filed within the prescribed period after the overruling of a
motion for new trial was in time." Because such motion was not
necessary as a basis for appeal and Section 1 1564 at that time
prescribed as the commencement of the period the date of
"the decision of the court where a motion for a new trial is not
necessary," the court relied expressly on subdivision 6 of section
I 1576, "that the verdict, report, or decision ... is contrary to
law," as here authorizing a motion for new trial. In an appro-
priation suit a motion for new trial, specifying that the petitioner
had no right to make the appropriation, that there was no
necessity therefor, and that the court was without authority to
impanel a jury was held to have been properly filed under sub-
divisions 6 or 8, since such a motion need not follow the exact
language of the statute, if the causes enumerated are such as are
embraced within the meaning of the statute. 8 Hence a bill of
exceptions taken from the overruling of the motion was in
time.' The Cullen case itself held that a motion for new trial
-7 Weaver v. The Columbus, Shawnee & Hocking Valley R'y Co., 55
Ohio St. 491, 45 N.E. 717 (1896); The Dayton & Union Railroad Com-
pany v. The Dayton & Muncie Traction Company, 72 Ohio St. 429, 74 N.E.
195 (i905) (motion for new trial in appropriation proceedings based on
errors in rulings on evidence and verdict and judgment against "law of the
case"); Rafferty v. The Toledo Traction Co., i9 Ohio C.C. 288 (1899),
aff'd, 64 Ohio St. 607, 6i N.E. 1147 (IgoI); Little v. Rees, 23 Ohio L.
Abs. 459 (1936).
Is Reusch v. The Northern Ohio Traction & Light Company, i9 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) i (1912), aff'd, 89 Ohio St. 456, io6 N.E. 1074 (1914).
49 See also 30 OHIO JURS. (i933) 99-io9; Fox v. The State, 34 Ohio
St. 377 (1878) (verdict not responsive to whole indictment); Burke v.
Bader, 114 Ohio St. 278, IPI N.E. 187 (1926) (jury disregarding issue
made verdict contrary to law); see Bozzelli v. Industrial Commission, 122
Ohio St. 201, 209, 171 N.E. IO8, 110 (1930) (sufficiency of petition can
be challenged by motion for new trial that verdict is contrary to law) ; Horn
v. Horn, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 349 (1938). Erroneously refusing to direct a
verdict, a motion therefor not having been renewed at the dose of all the
evidcnce is not the basis for judgment, but is grounds for a new trial, that
the verdict and judgment are contrary to law. The Cincinnati Traction Co.
v. Durack, 78 Ohio St. 243, 85 N.E. 38 (I9O8); The City of Zanesville v.
Stotts, 88 Ohio St. 557, io6 N.E. io5i (1913); The Youngstown & Subur-
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applying for a re-examination of the rulings of the trial court
on the admission and exclusion of evidence is cduly filed."'' 0
Yet the admissibility of evidence involves questions of law and
the court is asked to re-examine them by such motion. But
"a reexamination of the issues of facts presented by the plead-
ings" results only if the motion is granted. The comparison
between an issue of fact and one of law as the test of the pro-
priety of a motion for new trial fails to distinguish between the
question or issue presented to the court in deciding whether to
grant the motion for new trial and the later question or issue
presented on the new trial itself, if granted. The former is
always a question of law, even when the ground is that the
verdict or decision is against the weight of the evidence.5" If
the ground alleged is held to be well taken and a new trial
accorded, the same question need not again be reconsidered at
ban Ry. Co. v. Fauk, 114 Ohio St. 572, 151 N.E. 747 (19z6); Wehnes v.
Schliewe, 47 Ohio App. 452, 192 N.E. 1z (I934). A motion for directed
verdict here is now unnecessary. See i 16 Ohio Laws 413 (1935), amenditg,
Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 116oi. Cf. Minnear v. Holloway, 56 Ohio St. 148,
153-4, 46 N.E. 636, 637 (1897); Chapek v. The City of Lakewood, ii
Ohio App. 2o3 (1919) (motion for new trial essential after directed verdict).
The grounds for new trial under Section 1 1576 have been held not exclusive.
Brenzinger v. The American Exchange Bank, 66 Ohio St. 24z, 64 N.E. i 8
(i9o2); Wagner v. Long, 133 Ohio St. 41, I N.E. (2d) 247 (1937)-
Erroneously granting a directed verdict in other states with new trial statutes
like the one in Ohio has been held the basis for a motion for new trial.
Darling v. The Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, 76 Kan.
893; 93 Pac. 612 (907); Bottineau Land & Loan Company v. Hintze, i5o
Iowa.646, 125 N.E. 842 (1910). Or erroneously denying such motion.
Steele v. Werner, 83 P. (2d) 56 (Cal. App. 1938). Co=ra: Federal Land
Bank v. Gross, 178 Ga. 83, 172 S.E. 227 (1933) (nonsuit granted).
50 Cf. Sherer v. Piper, z6 Ohio St. 476 (1875); Masters V. The Cin-
cinnati Traction Co., 16 Ohio App. 99 (1922). Errors in the charge or
refusal to charge are the basis for such motion. White v. Thomas, 12 Ohio
St. 31? (1861); The Pennsylvania Company v. Miller & Co., 35 Ohio St.
541 (188o); Shelb v. Swank, 57 Ohio App. 144, 1z N.E. (2d) 417 (1937);
see Kline v. Wynne, Haynes & Co., 1o Ohio St. 223, 227 (1859). As is an
erroneous verdict because of misapprehension of the jury. The General
Convention v. Crocker, 7 Ohio C.C. 327 (1893); Schatzinger v. Boyd, 2Z
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 514 (1907).
" See Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 1723-1(?); Gilmore v. Doming, 31
Ohio L. Rep. 588, 589 (930). But cf. Werner v. Rowley, 129 Ohio St. 15,
193 N.E. 623 (1934).
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the second or new trial because it has already been decided.
At least such new trial is not granted for the purpose of re-
considering this question, but instead is to establish a new
record, to re-examine the factual issues, and is essential because
either disputed facts have not as yet been established or have
been erroneously found by the first verdict of the jury, report
of the referee, or decision of the court.
"Necessary Procedure." A new trial, being costly of time
and money, is never given unless necessary. Hence, if granting
one is the only way to correct the errors committed in the first
trial and alleged on motion as grounds for a new trial, the
motion, although not essential to lay a basis for appellate
review, should be considered not only "proper" and "author-
ized," but "necessary" procedure in accordance with the rule
of the Longman case." Thus in the usual case where a
motion for directed verdict is erroneously granted against
plaintiff at the close of his or of all the evidence and judgment
" "Necessary" is used here not as a basis for appellate review, but to cure
errors of the first trial. See The State, Ex Rel. Squire v. Winch, 6z Ohio
App. x6i, 16z, z3 N.E. (2d) 64z, 643 (i939) (motion "necessary" to have
trial court grant new trial); cf. fn. 42, supra. Another possible meaning of
"necessary" is "necessary" to perfect the bill of exceptions, especially under
amended Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11564, when the court of appeals deter-
mines that an appeal on questions of law and fact can be heard on questions
of law only. State ex. Everts v. Jackson, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 259 (1936)
(not chancery case); State ex. Warner v. Smith, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 313
(936); Schwenkel v. Schwenkel, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 321 (1936) (not chan-
cery case and no appeal bond); Edward Wren Co. v. Retail Clerks Union
Local No. 19o, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 95 (I938) (no appeal bond); see Stevens,
Observations on the Appelate Procedure Act (1939) 1z Ohio Bar 491,
502-3. But these cases seem to be restricted to situations where the alleged
errors involved the weight of the evidence, to review which a motion for
new trial made and overruled is essential. Furthermore Sec. 11564 expressly
provides for perfecting a bill of exceptions when no motion for new trial is
filed. Such motion will not delay the forty-day period to file when no trial
of issues based on pleadings has been had. Slater v. Brown, 43 Ohio App.
497, i83 N.E. 393 (1932); see fn. 40, supra. A miotion for new trial has
been held not a prerequisite to filing a bill of exceptions, although no question
of retaining an appeal under the proviso of Sec. 11564 was involved. State
ex Van Buren Twp. Bd. of Ed. v. Oakwood City Bd. of Ed., 32 Ohio L.
Abs. 378, 394 (940).
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is entered thereupon, a new trial, the constitutional 3 right
accorded plaintiff to reach a jury, granted on motion either by
the trial court or given on reversal and remand by the upper
court, is the only way to cure the error. 4 This situation is one
of an erroneous application of the law by the court, just as the
jury after making findings of fact may erroneously apply the law
thereto and thus necessitate, when facts are not separately found,
a new trial on the ground that the verdict is "contrary to law."
A motion for such new trial would in either case then be "duly
filed" and hence delay the twenty-day period.
Two queries, however, are hereby raised. Although upon
motion for directed verdict upon the pleadings and opening
statement or upon the evidence offered by plaintiff the jury is
directed to bring in a verdict,55 upon the granting of other types
of motions, raising the same question as to the legal sufficiency
13 See Ohio Const. Art. i, Sec. 5.
14 In the argument following the assumption is made that Section 11599
does not apply. If it does, judgment cannot be entered until the overruling
of the motion for new trial and the proviso of Section I zz3-7 is unnecessary.
Although Section 11599 may apply where a verdict is actually returned on
the granting of defendant's motion for directed verdict, it does not delay entry
of judgment where judgment is granted on motion without the form of a
jury verdict, as was done in the Cullenz case. Klein v. Realty Board Investors,
Inc., 48 Ohio App. 235, i92 N.E. 867 (i934). Contra: Ross v. Pfeiffer,
29 Ohio L. Abs. 47 (1939). Such distinction was made in McCallan v. Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Company, 5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 366
(i9o4) and Oster v. The Columbian National Fire Insurance Company,
29 Ohio L. Rep. 239 (i929). The entry of judgment may be delayed in
a jury case after granting a motion for such judgment as a matter of law
even though a jury is not used. When a verdict is directed, such seems to be
the practice. Cf. The Peoples and brovers Bank v. Craig, 63 Ohio St. 374,
59 N.E. io2 (19oo); Strangward v. The American Brass Bedstead Com-
pany, 82 Ohio St. 121, 91 N.E. 988 (i91o); Kasky v. Baltimore & Ohio
Rd. Co., 23 Ohio App. i85, 155 N.E. 174 (i926); City of Cincinnati v.
Board of Education, 63 Ohio App. 549, 27 N.E. (2d) 413 (1940). But
Section 11599 may not compel this practice. See Webb v. The Western
Reserve Bond & Share Co., 1I5 Ohio St. 247, 255, 153 N.E. 289, 291
(1926). Whether the statute does or does not apply should not be governed by
the form in which defendant requests judgment as a matter of law in his favor.
" Cf. Neckel v. Fox, iio Ohio St. 151, 143 N.E. 389 (924);
Czellath v. Schaub, 37 Ohio App. 232, 174 N.E. 599 (1930); Meizner v.
Coblitz, 39 Ohio App. 20, 176 N.E. 692 (1930); see Lehman v. Harvey,
45 Ohio App. Z15, 224, 187 N.E. ?8, 32 (1933).
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of plaintiff's case to date, no jury is needed or used to return a
verdict upon which judgment is entered."6 Into this class fall
motions for judgment upon the pleadings, the pleadings and
opening statement or upon the evidence alone, for non-suit,
or to arrest the evidence from the jury and to render judgment,
or a demurrer to the evidence, or objection to the introduction
of any evidence because of insufficiency of the petition." Here
it is arguable that a motion for new trial is not "duly filed"
within the definition of Section 11575 when, although a jury
is impaneled to hear the case, no verdict is ever returned after
which that motion may be filed. But a motion in such case
is filed after the "decision by the court" as specified in Section
11575. It is like a non-jury case. The need for a new trial to
cure the error involved in thus rendering judgment against
plaintiff is equally as great. No distinction affecting the pro-
priety of filing a motion for new trial should be grafted on the
fortuitous circumstance of the form in which defendant chooses
to test plaintiff's case and in which judgment is entered.
The second query is more difficult to answer. When can it
be said that one trial of an issue of fact has been had so that a
motion for new trial seeks a second or "new trial" within the
meaning of Section I 1575? When is a new, rather than the
first, trial necessary? This problem is especially pertinent to
the situation where the defendant is testing by motion the legal
sufficiency of plaintiff's case, for this can be done at any time
from the filing of the petition, by demurrer, 8 to a time even
5r Cf., Radebaugh v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, ?6 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 347 (C.P. 1925); Federal Land Bank v. Gross, 178 Ga. 73, 172 S.E.
227 (I933).
57 See Luberger and Meier, The Motioz irz Ohio Civil Procedure (1930)
4 U. CIN. L. REv. z51, 271-72, 274-79; cf. Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11601
(motion for judgment on pleadings or evidence at any time); The Wabash
Railroad Company v. Skiles, 64 Ohio St. 458, 6o N.E. 576 (I9OI) (suffi-
ciency of petition tested by objection to introduction of any testimony);
Rheinheimer v. The Aetna Life Insurance Company, 77 Ohio St. 36o,
83 N.E. 491 (907); Cullen v. Schmit, 137 Ohio St. 479, 30 N.E. (2d)
994 (940) (arresting evidence from jury).
S Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11303 and 11309.
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after the verdict, by motion notwithstanding the verdict." The
erroneous sustaining of a demurrer and entering of judgment
or rendering of judgment upon the pleadings will be the
grounds on appeal for remanding for the first trial of an issue of
fact.6" That a motion for new trial after dismissal of the petition
on hearing on demurrer is not proper or authorized procedure
is settled.6 But how much further must the proceedings ad-
vance before the upper court in reversing for error intervening
will remand for a new or second trial? Where should the line
be drawn? If a trial has begun, it must have ended either in a
verdict and judgment or decision from which an appeal is
taken."2 After such verdict or decision a motion for new trial is
filed. Hence the granting of the motion will result in a
new trial. The question then remains-When does a trial of an
issue of fact begin?
A trial has been defined in almost as many different ways
as there are situations which necessitate the defining of the
term," especially as to when it begins.6 For example, for
9 Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 116oi. The question can be raised for the
first time on appeal.
60 The Columbus Packing Co. v. The State, Ex. Rd. Schlesinger, io6
Ohio St. 469, 14o N.E. 376 (1922); Rhoades v. McDowell, 24 Ohio App.
94, 156 N.E. 526 (1927). But cf. Braun v. Pociey, 18 Ohio App. 370
(1923) (trial called "new").
61The State, Ex Rel. Longman v. Welsh, 133 Ohio St. 244, 13 N.E.
(2d) 119 (1938).6 28 See Garden City Feeder Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 804, 8o6
(C.C.A. 8th, 1935).
63 Railway Company v. Thurstin, 44 Ohio St. 525, 9 N.E. 232 (i886)
(hearing on motion to dismiss as "trial" in statute requiring court to state
facts upon which alleged errors and rulings during "trial" arise); Thompson
v. Denton, 95 Ohio St. 333, i16 N.E. 452 (1917) (order fixing compensa-
tion of receiver as appealable under "trial of chancery cases" clause in consti-
tutional jurisdiction of court of appeals); The State, Ex. Rel. Faber v. Jones,
95 Ohio St. 357, 116 N.E. 456 (1917) (same for motion in insolvency
courts).
64 State Ex Rd. Seney v. Toledo Gardeners Exchange Co., 65 Ohio L.
Bull. 243 (N.D. Ohio 192o) (petition for removal to federal court as filed
before "trial" in state court); State Ex Rel. Montana Central Railway Com-
pany v. District Court, 32 Mont. 37, 79 Pac. 546 (1905) (dismissal without
prejudice of action before "trial").
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purposes of review of "errors of law occuring at the trial"
rulings on impaneling a jury were held embraced within the
trial."5 Viewed abstractly, since the Ohio General Code includes
the sections on impaneling a jury under the Division on "Trial"
and the chapter on "Conduct of the Trial,""6 the trial might
be said to commence as soon as the issues have been made up
and the selection of the jury is about to begin. But something
more must happen than the impaneling of a jury before a final,
appealable order will be entered.67 Nothing on the merits has
been as yet decided. Then the next logical place where a trial
may be said to begin is when the jury is sworn and ready to
hear the case.6" The opening statement coming thereafter would
therefore be included within the trial.69 Hence an erroneous
granting of judgment after the opening statement, whether or
not a jury is used to bring in the verdict upon which judgment
is rendered, should be a proper ground for a motion for new
trial, since a trial granted thereon could be called new, one
trial already having been had."' It should not matter whether
the facts upon which judgment is entered are taken from the
evidence presented by plaintiff, assumed for purposes of the
"5 Hartnett v. State, 42 Ohio St. 568 (1885); Palmer v. State, 4± Ohio
St. 596 (1885).
0' Cf. Rules of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio
(1940), 18 (rules regarding impanelling jury placed under "The Conduct
of the Trial or Hearing").
1 Cf. The Equitable Securities Co. v. McDonald, 14 Ohio App. 56
(192o); Sunshine v. The Euclid-Io 5th Properties Co., 30 Ohio App. 151,
164 N.E. 539 (i9z8); The Long & Allstatter Co. v. Willis, 48 Ohio App.
366, 193 N.E. 774 (1934).
"S See Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11420-I (when jury is sworn, trial shall
proceed in order following ); cf. Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 13442-8 (order of
proceedings at criminal trial).
"See Wagner v. The State, 42 Ohio St. 537, 540-I (1885); Thomas
v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 119, 157 N.E. 488, 489 (927); Eastman v.
The State, 131 Ohio St. I, io, x N.E. (zd) 140, 144 (1936); The State v.
Grisafulli, 135 Ohio St. 87, 91, i9 N.E. (zd) 645, 647 (i939); of. The
State v. Blair, 24 Ohio App. 413, 157 N.E. 8oi (927) (jeopardy will not
attach till jury sworn).
70 Cf. The Compton Price Piano Co. v. Stewart, z 5 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
270 (1913).
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motion to be true, from the opening statement, or from the
allegations of the petition alone. The erroneous judgment
granted upon the pleadings immediately after the jury has
been selected, sworn, and hence ready to hear the case will
necessitate the process of impaneling another jury."' To draw
the line after the opening statement has been heard as to when
the trial begins is not logical when such statement can be
waived. But when a judgment is erroneously entered on the
pleadings before selection of a jury, the proper procedure is
either to allow the filing of further pleadings or, if complete, to
proceed to trial for the first time. A trial then could not here
be called "new." When after error has been pointed out, a
repetition of procedure, already-experienced, is necessary to cure
error involved, such repetition can be said to be a "new trial."7 2
Beginning the trial of an issue of fact at the point here
indicated for purposes of testing the propriety of a motion for
new trial also accords with the reasons underlying the statutory
grant of the privilege. The surroundings making for a less
studied, more hasty decision by the court, a re-examination of
which "under circumstances more favorable to its deliberate
consideration than attended the first investigation" is made pos-
sible by the motion for new trial, would seem to exist just as
soon as the jury is sworn and ready to hear the case. Even a
motion for judgment upon the pleadings alone would not
receive then as careful consideration as a demurrer or such a
71 Cf. The ,Davis Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Whitmore, 92 Ohio St.
44, 11 o N.E. 5 18 (19155) ; Tyler v. The Vistula Realty Co., 31 Ohio App.
i, 166 N.E. 240 (1929).
72 A case could occur of a motion for judgment upon the pleadings erron-
eously granted after selection, but before swearing-in of the jury. To argue
that a trial begins only after a jury is prepared to hear the case is logically
inconsistent with the implication, arising from characterizing the selection of
a jury the second time as the process of a new trial, that such selection the
first time is a trial. But if no jury were originally picked, to select one does
not have that repetitious quality that can be called "new," "second," or
"cagain," as does the selection of another jury. The dilemma might be
answered by declaring that starting to impanel a jury commences a trial, but
that no second or new trial can be had unless enough has occurred in the first
that something can be repeated in the second to give it that ccsecond" or(Cnew" quality. Whichever approach is followed, the result is the same.
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motion made during the pleading stage, unless the case were
continued. Although the reason for a motion for new trial
might not exist in some cases, a specific rule applicable generally
must be established to afford the certainty which rules of
procedure demand.
When a jury is waived or not permitted, as in an action in
equity, the swearing-in of a jury cannot be the time of the com-
mencement of the trial. The court acting as trier of fact, the
trial should by analogy commence when the court is ready to
hear the evidence. Here defendant's motion in the nature of a
directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case presents, unlike
the situation when the case is heard by jury, a question of fact,
whether the evidence thus far preponderates in favor of plain-
tiff or defendant.7" The same question is presented to the court,
when although the case is being heard by a jury, cross motions
for directed verdict are made at such time and without such
request that the case go to the jury that the court thereby
becomes trier of fact.74 Necessarily these motions cannot be
made until the trial has begun in that the jury has been impan-
eled, sworn, and is ready to hear the case." To review this
factual decision of the court a motion for new trial is necessary
in accordance with the well settled rule as a basis to urge on
appeal the assignment of error that such decision is against the
weight of the evidence."
73 The Euclid Arcade Building Co. v. The H. A. Stahl Co., 99 Ohio St.
47, 121 N.E. 82o (1918); Kroger v. Clark, 52 Ohio App. 33, 2 N.E. (7d)
623 (1935); Young v. W. E. Hutton & Co., 7 Ohio Op. 191 (C. of A.
1936).
7. First National Bank v. Hayes & Sons, 64 Ohio St. 100, 59 N.E. 893
(19O1); Strangward v. The American Brass Bedstead Company, 87 Ohio St.
12i, 91 N.E. 988 (i9IO); Industrial Commission v. Carden, 129 Ohio St.
344, 195 N.E. 55I (I935); The Buckeye State Building & Loan Co. v.
Schmidt, 131 Ohio St. 132, 2 N.E. (2d) 264 (1936); see Note (I937)
i i U. Cin. L. Rev. 72.
7 Cf. Strangward v. The American Brass Bedstead Company, 82 Ohio
St. 12I, 91 N.E. 988 ( 91o) (cross motions after pleadings read to jury).
70 See fn. 42, supra. Furthermore the Boedker case is here applicable,
being of necessity an action at law. Industrial Commission v. Baker, 13 Ohio
L. Abs. 64 (1932), reversed on merits, 1?7 Ohio St. 345, 188 N.E. 56o
(1933).
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Thus far the situation considered has been one where, after
a jury or court as trier of fact is prepared to hear the case on the
issues of fact, the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's case, presented
either on the petition alone, the pleadings and opening state-
ment, or evidence alone, all questions of law, is tested on
motion and erroneously found to be defective. The only way to
cure the error involved is to grant plaintiff a new trial, either
on motion in the lower court or on reversal and remand by the
upper. But the "necessity" test breaks down where the reverse
situation is presented, where at any time after trial has begun,
the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's case thus far presented on the
pleadings, opening statement, or evidence is tested on motion
and erroneously found to be sufficient. In other words, the
motion is denied and plaintiff is given the right to go to a jury,
which returns a verdict in his favor. Then, if the overruling of
such motion is found to have been erroueous, upon a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Ohio Gen. Code,
Section 116oi, the proper judgment can be immediately en-
tered for defendant without the need for a new trial." Prior
to the amendment of Section 116oi in 1935," however, the
77 Whether a new trial is needed to cure the error intervening is illus-
trated by whether the upper court can on reversing enter the judgment which
the lower court should have rendered. Minnear v. Holloway, 56 Ohio St.
148, 46 N.E. 636 (1897) shows that this power turns on whether there is a
disputed factual issue. Compare Reiff v. Mullholland, 65 Ohio St. 178,
6? N.E. 124 (19o); Majoros v. The Cleveland Interurban Rd. Co., 17
Ohio St. 255, 187 N.E. 857 (1933); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Martin,
127 Ohio St. 499, 189 N.E. 244 (I934.), with Hickman v. The Ohio State
Life Insurance Company, 92 Ohio St. 87, i iO N.E. 542 (1915); Nyiry v.
Modern Brotherhood, 92 Ohio St. 387, 11o N.E. 943 (1915) ; The Bridge-
port Bank Co. v. The Shadyside Coal Co., 121 Ohio St. 544, 17o N.E. 358
(1930); Curry v. Manfull, 123 Ohio St. 118, 174 N.E. 248 (1930); Ohio
Gen. Code, Sec. 116oi (no judgment on ground verdict against weight of
evidence).
78 116 Ohio Laws 413 (1935). The amendment permits judgment
notwithstanding the verdict to be rendered "upon the evidence received upon
the trial," as well as "upon the statement in the pleadings" previously pro-
vided for. Magyar v. The Prudential Ins. Co., 133 Ohio St. 563, 15 N.E.
(2d) 144 (1938); see Comment (95) 34 Micu. L. REv. 93; cf. Note
(1936) 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 481.
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only remedy for this situation was to grant a motion for new
trial, 7 which would make such motion here highly authorized
and proper. But the short answer regarding the effect of a
motion for new trial on the time to appeal in this situation is
that following a jury verdict, Ohio Gen. Code, Section I 1599
would prevent the entry of judgment until overruling of such
motion. No appealable order could be entered until then and the
time to appeal would run only thereafter.
In an action in equity, where Section I1599 would not apply
to delay ipso facto the time to appeal, and also in a jury case
where the court is trier of fact, the erroneous refusal to give
judgment for defendant on motion at the close of plaintiff's
evidence presents merely a question of the weight and suffici-
ency of such evidence to sustain the decision of the court to be
urged on motion as grounds for new trial. Hence such motion
would be clearly authorized and proper and even necessary to
form the basis for review on appeal of this question of law.
But where defendant's motion for judgment upon the plead-
ings, or pleadings and opening statement, or objection to the
introduction of testimony because of insufficiency of the petition,
should have been granted, a motion for new trial cannot allege
insufficiency of the evidence to support the decision because
none has been presented. Here when the court has erroneously
overruled defendant's motion testing the legal sufficiency of
plaintiff's case, a motion for judgment under Section 116oi
would authorize the immediate rendering of judgment for
defendant without the need of a new trial. Such statute, how-
ever, should not be held to preclude defendant from seeking a
new trial for the same reason.8" Furthermore, the case after
"'The Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Richter, 131 Ohio St. 433,
3 N.E. (2d) 408 (1936), overruling, Lehman v. Harvey, 45 Ohio App 215,
187 N.E. 28 (933), petition in error dismissed, 127 Ohio St. 159 (1933),
(1935) 39 Ohio L. Rep. 536, 9 U. CIN. L. REv. 67.
" A motion for new trial, that the verdict is contrary to law, should not
be precluded by amended Section I 6oI. Alleging the insufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict and filed along with a motion for judgment
under Section 116oi, it is not only proper, but necessary to raise that error
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such erroneous ruling proceeding further to trial, other grounds
for a new trial would probably be present. A re-examination
of issues of fact being requested after an examination of such
issues already, the motion for new trial should be considered
"duly filed" so that the twenty-day period is tolled during its
pendency."'
To be distinguished from the situations just discussed
where, although a trial on the facts has begun, the trial has
ended in the disposition of the case as a matter of law, making
it unnecessary for the jury or court to resolve the disputed
factual issues involved, is the situation where because of an
agreed statement of facts (or stipulation of counsel) no disputed
issue of fact ever has been tried or decided because a dispute
thereon no longer exists. Need neither to try originally an
issue of fact nor to re-examine it in a new trial is present, for an
erroneous application of law to those agreed facts can be cured
in the trial court by re-applying the law thereto, a process which
upon review. Because of the difference in quantum of evidence required in
each case prudent technique would require the filing of both of such motions.
Cf. Davis v. Turner, 69 Ohio St. IOI, 68 N.E. 819 (903); Thompson v.
Rutledge, 32 Ohio App. 537, 168 N.E. 547 (1929); Slicker v. Seccombe,
42 Ohio App. 357, 18z N.E. 131 (1931); Benning v. Schlemmer, 57 Ohio
App. 457, 14 N.E. (2d) 941 (1937); Kelley v. Columbus Railway, Power
& Light Co., 6? Ohio App. 397, 24 N.E. (2d) 290 (1928); see The Jacob
Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton, 118 Ohio St. io6, 120, 16o N.E. 629, 633
(1928). Cf. Davis v. Turner, supra; The Chris Holl Hardware Co. v. The
Logan Brick Supply Co., 84 Ohio St. 455, 95 N.E. 1144 (1911); The
Hocking Valley Mining Co. v. Hunter, 130 Ohio St. 333, 199 N.E. 184
(1935); The Cincinnati Goodwill Industries v. Neuerman, 130 Ohio St.
334, 199 N.E. 178 (1935); Michigan-Ohio-Indiana Coal Assn. v. Nigh,
131 Ohio St. 405, 3 N.E. (zd) 355 (1936), (1937) 4 U. CiN. L. REv. 153;
Hubbuch v. City of Springfield, 131 Ohio St. 413, 3 N.E. (2d) 359
(1936); Murphy v. The Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 132 Ohio St. 68, 4 N.E.
(2d) 983 (1936), (937) 8 Ohio Op. 24; Durbin v. The Humphrey Co.,
133 Ohio St. 367, 14 N.E. (2d) 5 (1938) all showing that granting a new
trial and refusal to direct a verdict or to let one stand constitute a final order.
Cf. McClanahan v. Koviak, 62 Ohio App. 307, 23 N.E. (zd) 975 (939)
(does proviso of Section 12223-7 re-enact rule of this line of cases?)
Si Throughout, the case where defendant is testing the legal sufficiency
of plaintiff's case to date has been discussed. The same principles would be
applicable where plaintiff is testing the legal sufficiency of defendant's affirm-
ative defense.
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does not necessitate a new trial of issues of fact. Hence a motion
for new trial after judgment, where the court has merely
applied the law to undisputed facts clearly established, whether
the action be at law or equity, would not be authorized or proper
and hence would not toll the period for review.82 Some diffi-
culty arises, however, in answering the subsidiary question
whether an issue of fact may still exist where the record shows
an agreed statement or stipulation. To make a motion for new
trial improper because no issue of fact is present, the agreed
statement or stipulation must contain all the ultimate facts, with
nothing left for the court to do but to apply the law to them.
If from such agreed statement inferences and conclusions may
further be drawn as to the facts, the agreed statement or stipu-
lation merely relieves the trier of fact of the duty of passing on
the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence, oral or
documentary. Only the evidence is agreed upon, leaving the
ultimate facts, some or all, still in issue." A motion for new
trial, if granted here, would be seeking a re-examination of these
issues of fact within the meaning of the Cullen case.
PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
By analogy the present practice in the Federal Courts"'
" Conner v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D.
Mo. 1939); ef. Baker v. Frazier, 137 Ohio St. 479, 30 N.E. (2d) 994
(1940); se fn. 77 supra; cf. Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11420-14 and 11421-4.
" Compare The Bank of Virginia v. The Bank of Chillicothe, 16 Ohio
170 (847), with Clinton Bank v. Ayres, 16 Ohio z8z (184.7). Compare
Spangler v. Brown, 26 Ohio St. 389 (1875), with McGonnigle v. Arthur,
27 Ohio St. 251 (875). Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Anchor White Lead Co.,
44 Ohio St. 243, 7 N.E. ii (1886) ; Hickman v. The Ohio State Life Insur-
ance Company, 92 Ohio St. 87, 11o N.E. 542 (1915); Vignola v. The New
York Central Railroad Co., IO2 Ohio St. 194 ,131 N.E. 357 (1921); The
Celtic Building Ass'n v. Regan, 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 364 (Dist. Ct. 1884).
Schwartz v. The Sandusky County Savings & Loan Co., 65 Ohio App. 437,
30 N.E. (2d) 556 (939) (application of Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 11571
making bill of exceptions unnecessary where agreed statement of facts exists) ;
cf. Thomas Emery's Sons v. Irving National Bank, 25 Ohio St. 360 (1874).
' See New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Related to Judicial Pro-
cedure in Ohio (I939) 13 U. CIN. L. REv. I, 129-134; Symposium on the
Movement for the Simplification of Legal Procedure (1939) 15 TENN. L.
REv. 511, 551-86.
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regarding the effect of a motion for new trial upon the time to
seek appellate review may be helpful. Rule 73 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:-
"When an appeal is permitted by law from a district
court to a circuit court of appeals and within the time
prescribed, a party may appeal from a judgment by filing
with the district court a notice of appeal .... ),85
0
The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules tell us that
this "rule continues in effect the statutes providing for the time
for taking an appeal such as: U.S.C., Title 28. . . Sec. 230
(Time for making application for appeal)". The statute reads:
"No appeal intended to bring any judgment or decree
before a circuit court of appeals for review shall be allowed
unless application therefor be duly made within three
months after the entry8 of such judgment or decree."8 "
Rule 59 pertaining to the motion for new trial, says nothing
about the effect of such motion on the time to file a notice of
appeal, but amalgamates the petition for rehearing of former
Equity Rule 69 with the motion for new trial of Title 28
U.S.C., Section 391,"8 otherwise leaving the nature of a new
trial and the grounds for which granted in accordance with the
former law."
Although no clue is given in these two rules and statutes
to answer the problem of the effect of such motion upon the
time for appellate review, the generalization is with safety
85 The Rules were effective September I6, 1938. Rule 86.
86See Rule 58. "Entry of Judgment."
87 26 Stat. 829 (i891), amended by, 43 Stat. 940 (1925), amended
by, 45 Stat. 54 (1928).
88 36 Stat. 1163 (1911), amended by, 40 Stat. 118I (1919), amended
by, 45 Stat. 54 (1928).
89 Rule 59 (a) GROUNDS. "A new trial may be granted to all or any
of the parties and on all or part of the issues (I) in an action in which there
has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States;
and (2) in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which
rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts of
the United States . . ." See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
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asserted that timely service of a motion for new trial under Rule
59 or for amended findings under Rule 52 (b) or presumably
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 5o (b)
suspends the time for appeal while the motion is pending."0
Otherwise such time would be running, since, unlike the effect
of Ohio General Code, Section 11'599, the entry of judgment
in actions at law in the federal courts is not stayed pending the
disposition of a motion for new trial."
The basis of the present practice, to compute the time for
appellate review from the ultimate disposition of such motion,
is Brockett v. Brockett12 heard on motion to dismiss the appeal.
To a final decree pronounced May ioth a petition to reopen was
filed and referred during the same term. Upon report made
thereon June 9th, the court refused to open its former decree.
An appeal was taken from both orders. The Supreme Court
held that although no appeal could be taken from the refusal
to open the former decree, the matter resting in the sound dis-
cretion of the court below, yet the bond was an effective stay of
execution because given within IO days after final decree. The
"decree of the ioth of May was suspended by the subsequent
action of the court; and it did not take effect until the 9th of
June .... "The appeal was taken and the bond given within ten
days of this last date." Thus in accordance with the New Rules
"°See 3 MOORE'S, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3393; 3 PIKE AND
FISCHER, FEDERAL RULES SERVICE (1940) 735.
"1 Rule 59 (b) TIME FOR MOTION. "A motion for a new trial shall
be served not later than IO days after the entry of the judgment .... " Rule
58. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. "Unless the court otherwise directs, judg-
ment upon the verdict of a jury shall be entered forthwith by the clerk; ..."
But under this rule on motion the court has granted a stay of entry of judg-
ment pending disposition of defendant's motion for dismissal and for new
trial. Voelker v. Delaware, L., & W. R. Co., 31 F. Supp. 515 (W.D.N.Y.
1939).
02 ? How. 238 (U.S. 1844).
"' Although this case involved the question of whether the appeal was in
time to stay execution, it is cited for the proposition that the time for seeking
appellate review is likewise suspended. Cases following this rule are, Railroad
Company v. Bradleys, 7 Wall. 575 (U.S. 1868); Memphis v. Brown, 94
U.S. 715 (1876); Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Murphy, Iii U.S.
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rendering applicable the former practice time for appellate
review does not commence until denial of a motion for new
trial.9 4
Under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 391 reading: -.--"All United
States courts shall have power to grant new trials, in cases
where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for which new
trials have usually been granted in the courts of law.. .1,, made
still applicable by the New Federal Rules, contrary to the
present uncertainty in Ohio, a new trial is a "proper" remedy
for plaintiff after nonsuit under Rule 41 (b) "8 has been granted
against him." Where a motion for directed verdict has erron-
eously been denied and judgment upon the verdict entered
against the party moving for such directed verdict, a new trial
would seem here also to be a proper remedy. 8
488 (1884); Aspen Mining and Smelting Company v. Billings, x5o U.S. 31
(1893); Voorhees v. John T. Noye Manufacturing Company, 151 U.S. 135
(1894); Kingman v. Western Manufacturing Company, 170 U.S. 675
(1898); United States v. Ellicott, 223 U.S. 524 (I912); Chicago, Great
Western Railroad Company v. Basham, 249 U.S. 164 (1918); Morse v.
United States, 270 U.S. I5' (1926); cf. Luckenbach Steamship Company v.
United States, 272 U.S. 533 (1q26); The Liberal Savings & Loan Co. v.
The Frankel Realty Co., 64 Ohio App. 97, 28 N.E. (2d) 367 (940)
(dissent).
" Burke v. Canfield, iii F. (?d) 526 (App.D.C. 1940); Reliance
Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 112 F. (2d) 234 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940); Hawley v.
Hawley, I 14 F. (2d) 745 (App.D.C. 194o); cf. Neely v. Merchants Trust
Co., IIo F. (3 d) 525 (C.C.A. 3d, 1940); see Abruzzino v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 925, 926 (N.D.W.Va. 1940).
95 A motion for a new trial is not essential to review the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence in federal courts. Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Tier-
nan, 263 Fed. 325 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920); cf. American Distilling Co. v. Wis-
consin Liquor Co., lO4 F. (2d) 583 (C.C.A. 7th, 1939) (motion for new
trial not condition precedent for appeal); Conner v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D.Mo. 1939) (no new trial given
when facts clear and undisputed).
" Rule 47 (b) reads in part: "After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant . . . , may move for a dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief."
'7 Southwell v. Robertson, 27 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.Pa. 1939), Contra:
Federal Land Bank v. Gross, 178 Ga. 83, 172 S.E. 227 (I933).
"'Rule 50 (b) RESERVATION OF DECISION ON MOTION.
"Whenever a motion for directed verdict . . . is denied . . . , the court is
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Although the federal courts have been liberal in holding
that the filing of defective petitions or motions for rehearing
or new trial postpones the time for appeal,"' a motion or
petition filed only for the purpose of affording an opportunity
to perfect an appeal in time has no such consequence.' Further-
more, new emphasis has recently been placed upon a qualifica-
tion to the general rule that filing a motion for new trial or
petition for rehearing will suspend the time for appeal. This
qualification is that to have such an effect the motion or petition
must be "entertained"'.' and is also based upon the case of
Brockett v. Brockett, although the nearest the Supreme Court
there approached the doctrine was in pointing out with respect
to the petition for rehearing that the lower "court took cog-
nizance... and referred it to a master commissioner.". 2 When
deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determi-
nation of the legal question raised by the motion. Within io days after the
reception of a verdict, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may
move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to
have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict;
. . . A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial
may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may
allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order
a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had
been directed .... " Compare Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, i I 2 F. (ad)
Z34 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940), with Pruitt v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., I ? F. (ad) 140 (C.C.A. 5th, 194o) ; Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co., Inc.,
IX2 F. (2d) 577 (App.D.C. 1940); Thompson v. Rutledge, 32 Ohio App.
537, 168 N.E. 547 (1929), and Benning v. Schlemmer, 57 Ohio App. 457,
14 N.E. (a) 941 (937). Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S.
243 (940), (t941) 54 HARV. L. REV. 694, 14 So. CAL1F. L. REV. 198.
" Thomas Day Co. v. Doble Laboratories, 41 F. (ad) 51 (C.C.A. 9 th,
1930) cert. deizied, 282 U.S. 883 (1930); The Astorian, 57 F. (ad) 85
(C.C.A. 9th, 193 a) (petition for libel treated as petition for rehearing); cf.
Cambuston v. United States, 95 U.S. 285 (1877).
10o Title Guaranty & Surety Company v. United States, 22Z U.S. 401
(1912); Kiehn v. Dodge County, 59 F. (2d) 503 (C.C.A. 8th, 1927);
Mintz v. Lester, 95 F. (2d) 590 (C.C.A. ioth, 1938); Fiske v. Wallace,
xi 5 F. (ad) 1003 (C.C.A. 8th, 1940) (motion to amend filed after other
side had taken appeal); cf. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Sny-
der, 109 F. (2d) 469 (C.C.A. 6th, 1940).
101 Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U.S. 131
0937), 5 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 908.
10" See Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Murphy, II I U.S. 488,
489 (884).
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does the court from which the appeal is taken "entertain" a
petition for rehearing was answered with reference to the
specific situation of a bankruptcy case in Wayne United Gas Co.
v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.' There after the Circuit Court of
Appeals had denied a petition for allowance of appeal from an
original order dismissing a petition filed under Section 77 (b)
of the Bankruptcy Act, prompt application in the District Court
to vacate and for rehearing was made and granted. A supple-
mental petition under Section 77 (b) was then presented. The
original and supplemental petitions were considered upon their
merits and the court after hearing dismissed such petitions,
making findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto. There was no indication that the petition for rehearing
was not made in good faith or that the court received it for
the purpose of extending petitioner's time for appeal. No rights
had intervened which would render it inequitable to reconsider
the merits. No abuse of sound discretion in granting the motion
and in reconsidering the cause existed. Even though the court
reaffirmed its former action and refused to enter a decree
different from the original one, the order entered upon re-
hearing was held appealable and the time for appeal ran from its
entry. But "a defeated party who applies for a rehearing and
does not appeal from the judgment or decree within the time
limited for so doing, takes the risk that he may lose his right of
appeal, as the application for rehearing, if the court refuse to
entertain it, does not extend the time for appeal."
In Bowman v. Loperena,°4 involving an application for
an extension under Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, the
debtor filed a petition for rehearing to vacate an adjudication in
bakruptcy. The district judge endorsed thereupon that the
"petition having been 'seanonably presented' and 'entertained'
by the above entitled court, permission to file" it was thereby
granted. The petition for rehearing was heard. An opinion and
103 300 U.S. I3 (1937).
104 311 U.S. ?6z (1940); see I re Cury, 34 F. Supp. 526, 528-9
(W.D.Va 1940) (rehearing and appeal time independent).
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order denying it was rendered. The Supreme Court held that,
although this petition for rehearing was filed out of time, the
endorsement upon it by a judge of the lower court, the hearing
held, and the opinion announced all demonstrated that it was
entertained by the court and dealt with upon its merits. Hence
until the order thereon, no final decision had been rendered
sustaining the adjudication as against the debtor's attack.' °
But, when an application for leave to file a second petition for
rehearing was denied, the pendency of such application did not
suspend the time to seek a writ of certiorari.' When a petition
or motion is not filed in time, the court has no power to permit
it to be filed."°7 Conversely when a motion for new trial or
petition for rehearing is filed within the time required and is
based upon permissible grounds, it is filed as of right. The
court should have no power but to "entertain" or consider it
upon the merits so that during its pendency the time for appeal
is suspended.' Hence the doctrine of "entertainment" should
105 Cf. Carpenter, Babson & Findler v. Condor Pictures, Inc., io8 F.
(ad) 318 (C.C.A. 9 th, 1939) (endorsement on petition for rehearing-filed
in good faith not for purpose of delay or extending time to appeal); Chapman
v. Federal Land Bank, 117 F. (2d) 321 (C.C.A. 6th, 1941) (petition for
rehearing "denied" and later "overruled" not "entertained").
1oo Gypsy Oil Company v. Escoe, 275 U.s. 498 (1927) (motion for
leave must be timely and petition actually entertained) ; cf. Roemer v. Bern-
heim, 132 U.S. 103 (i 889) (rehearing granted upon condition not complied
with); Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151 (i9z6).
07 Payne v. Garth, 285 Fed. 301 (C.C.A. 8th, 1922) (motion for new
trial filed after term expired); cf. Rule 5 9(b) of New Federal Rules.
10' Payne v. Garth, 285 Fed. 301 (C.C.A. 8th, 1922) (statute gives
right to review of judgment in jury case by motion for new trial and no
action or inaction of court can oust it of jurisdiction to entertain and deter-
mine this given right); see Larkin Packer Co. v. Hinderliter Tool Co., 6o F.
(ad) 491, 493 (C.C.A. ioth, 1932); cf. Kingman v. Western Manufac-
turing Company, 170 U.S. 675 (1898); Southland Industries, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 99 F. (2d) 117 (App. D.C. 1938) (petition
for rehearing being matter of right, no leave to file required and Commission
is without power to refuse to entertain it); Oritz v. Public Service Commis-
sion, io8 F. (2d) 8i5 (C.C.A. Ist, 1940). At p. 816 Judge Magruder
wrote, "It may be that where the published rules of court allow the filing of.
a petition for rehearing within a stipulated time after entry of the judgment,
a petition filed within that time will be regarded as 'entertained,' without
more, on the ground that the court is bound to give consideration to a petition
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give no further trouble under the New Federal Rules, when a
motion for new trial is filed in accordance with Rule 59 as a
matter of right."9 The distinction between a motion filed as a
matter of right and therefore "entertained" and one filed as a
matter of grace on leave of court and not "entertained" until
leave granted, is drawn in Rule 59 (b) where an exception to
the ten-day period given to file the motion for new trial is
"that a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence may be made after the expiration of such period
and before the expiration of the time for appeal, with leave
of court obtained on notice and hearing and on a showing of due
diligence." (italics supplied). Without the provision for
"leave of court obtained" a motion for new trial could either be
used in a dilatory manner as an extension of time for appeal..
or would cause endless litigation as to when such motion, served
beyond the ten-day period, has been "entertained."
This doctrine of "entertainment," as applied to Ohio prac-
tice, seems to raise the question as to when a motion for new trial
filed within time is authorized or "proper procedure" and hence
"duly filed." Thus a timely motion properly filed must be
"entertained?' by the court so that the time to appeal would be
for rehearing the filing of which has been invited by its rule." But when the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in its order denying the petition for appeal
recited that the motion for rehearing "was denied ...without a hearing or
written opinion and therefore was not entertained by the court . . . , " this
recital was not disregarded and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion. Compare Geiger v. The American Seeding Machine Co., 124 Ohio St.
232, 117 N.E. 594 (I93I), with Duncan v. The State, Ex Rd. Williams,
119 Ohio St. 453, 164 N.E. 527 (1928).
109 This conclusion would permit a motion filed to an action at law or
equity for any of the reasons heretofore available and served not later than
ten days after entry of judgment. Cf. The Eldridge and Higgins Company
v. Barrere, 74 Ohio St. 389, 78 N.E. 516 (19o6) (motion for new trial filed
in time must be considered on merits); Hoffman v. Knollman, 135 Ohio St.
170, 20 N.E. (2d) 221 0939).
'10 See 3 MOORE's, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3250-52 (to prevent use
of motion for new trial to extend time to appeal); Nachod & United States
Signal Co., Inc. v. Automatic Signal Corporation, 26 F. Supp. 418 (D. Conn.
1939), aff'd, 1O5 F. (2d) 981 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939); Theiss v. Owens-
Ilinois Glass Co., 1 F.R.D. 175 (W.D. Pa. 194o).
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suspended during the pendency of such motion."1 The chief
help then, derived from an analysis of the practice under the
New Federal Rules, is a perspective of the wide use of the
motion for new trial, its nature, and the grounds for which a
new trial is granted.
CONCLUSION
In advocating the application of Sections 11576 and 11564,
expressly related to Section I 1576 by the Weaver case, along
with Section I 1575, in determining the propriety of a motion
for new trial a reconciliation of Sections I 1564 and I 1576 with
Section I1575 in terms of statutory interpretation must be
attempted. Thus, in harmonizing these sections to make a
sensible, working procedure "issue of fact" in Section I 1575-
the definition of a new trial- seems to be used in the broad
sense as a determination of the ultimate facts. But a general
verdict or decision of the court does not include merely a finding
of the ultimate facts. It involves also an application of law to
those findings." 2 Hence, a motion for new trial will allege as
grounds for a new trial whatever has caused the ultimate result,
verdict or decision, to be erroneous, whether an erroneous
finding of fact because of rulings during the trial or because of
improper evaluating of the evidence or an erroneous application
of law to those facts correctly found. The court in considering
on motion these alleged grounds for new trial may or may not
be re-examining the question involved. If the grounds alleged
are the erroneous granting of a motion for directed verdict or
judgment or rulings on evidence, the court will be reconsidering
"I An analogy in Ohio practice is the distinction between appeal to the
Supreme Court of Ohio as of right and "on leave first obtained" or not "with-
out its leave" as provided in the Constitution of Ohio, Article IV, Section 2,
and Ohio Gen. Code, Sec. 12223-29.
"12 It might be argued that a motion for new trial should not be filed after
special verdict, since only facts have been found and not the application
of law thereto unlike a general verdict. Hence the motion for new trial should
not be filed until judgment is entered upon such special verdict. If the error
alleged has arisen only in the second step, the application of law, the finding
of fact being correct, a new trial would not be necessary to cure the error and
hence not properly filed to delay the time for appellate review. See fn. 13,
sFupra.
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the issues involved. If the grounds are an erroneous finding
of fact by verdict because against the weight of the evidence or
an erroneous application of law thereto by the jury, the court
will then be examining these issues for the first time. But
whether an examination or re-examination, the issues presented
to the court on the motion for new trial are always issues of
law. "Reexamination" in the definition of "duly filed" in the
Callen case does not mean re-examination in considering the
motion for new trial, but re-examination on the new trial itself,
if the motion is granted. A trial originally having been had
because facts were disputed, since the facts have not as yet been
correctly determined, " a reexamination of the issues of fact
presented by the pleadings" is necessary. But no need exists to
reconsider there the question of law involved in the motion for
new trial already granted."3 Thus, where a motion for new
trial is sought on the ground that a verdict has been erroneously
directed for defendant or in some other way the case has been
taken from the jury and judgment rendered for defendant, the
court again passing upon the question of the legal sufficiency of
plaintiff's case on a motion for new trial has a question of law
to decide. But the new trial, if granted by deciding in favor
of the moving party, here plaintiff, results in a re-examination
of an issue of fact. If on the same evidence presented by plain-
tiff a motion for directed verdict or for judgment is made by
defendant, although thereby an issue of law is presented, it need
not be retried because a re-examination thereof has already
occurred when the court was considering whether to grant the
motion for new trial. The granting of such motion was a ruling
upon that question of law and has resulted in a new trial of an
issue of fact. Thus a motion for new trial is here "duly filed."
In summing up then, if a trial has begun which is to try an
issue of fact, either before a jury or court, the ultimate facts
"-- Even though the same question of law is re-examined in the second
trial, such new trial is primarily to resolve the disputed factual issues. Some
of the confusion may be caused by the fact that a jury not only resolves such
issues, but decides questions of law as well in applying the law to the facts.
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being in dispute, even though such facts are determined other
than by a resolution of that dispute by the trier of fact," 4 jury
or court, (as in the case of a directed verdict or judgment on
the pleadings and opening statement or evidence), an applica-
tion to secure another hearing is one seeking an opportunity to
try those same disputed factual issues after one attempt has
resulted in some error intervening. Such an application fits
the definition of Section I 1575 as requesting a "re-examination,
in the same court, of an issue of fact, after a verdict by a jury,
a report of a referee or master, or a decision by the court." In all
such cases the time to file a notice of appeal under the proviso
of Section 12223-7 will not commence until the disposition of
such motion for new trial, because the motion is here "duly
filed" within the meaning of the pertinent sections of the Ohio
General Code and the Cullen case."'
The rules of procedure should be clear, certain, and easy to
apply. A specific rule should also fit logically into the whole
scheme of procedure. It is with this purpose, to fit the proviso
of Section 12223-7 into the analogous sections of the Ohio Code
of Procedure as well as to enunciate a rule, clear, certain, fair,
and easy to apply, that this analysis has been made. If, how-
ever, it helps to prevent confusion and diversity of opinion from
arising out of the decision and opinion in the Callen case similar
to that which arose from the Longrnan case"6 it will have served
some useful purpose.
114 Cf. Darling v. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company,
76 Kan. 893, 894, 93 Pac. 61z, 612-13 (1907).
115 A careful lawyer, however, in every case where it can be argued that
a motion for new trial will not delay the time for appeal should either secure
such prompt disposal of his motion that the twenty-day period has not yet run
from the entry of judgment or should file his notice of appeal while the
motion is pending in accordance with the rule of the Liberal Savings & Loan
Co. case in an action in equity. A second notice after the overruling of the
motion should, to avoid any argument that the first is premature, be filed, if
the action is one at law to which Section I 1599 is not applicable. See fn. 54,
supra. The function of such lawyer is not ultimately to vindicate the remedial
rights of his client in court, but to prevent the delay, expense, anxiety and
uncertainty of litigation over such rights to the detriment of the substantive
rights of his client.
118 See the remarks of Herbert E. Ritchie in The Status of the Rule of
Judicial Precedent (1940) 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 252, 254-6.
